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“We can’t reject something just because it’s stupid.”
– Esther M. Kepplinger, Deputy Commissioner of the U.S.
Patent & Trademark Office. 1
“Microsoft Patents Ones, Zeroes.”
– THE ONION, March 25, 1998. 2
INTRODUCTION
The United States patent system is facing a crisis of
confidence. There is a widespread perception that changes in the
standards of patentability, the increasing importance of the
information economy and the sheer volume of applications before
the United States Patent and Trademark Office (Patent Office)
have combined to overwhelm the patent system. 3
Bad patents and costly litigation lie at the heart of this crisis.
Academics, business leaders and government officials have all
expressed concern that too many patents are issued for
“inventions” that are obvious, vague or already widely used. 4 In
1. Responding to the Federal Circuit’s decision in In re Lee, 277 F.3d 1338,
1345 (Fed. Cir. 2002). See David Streitfeld, Note: This Headline is Patented, L.A.
TIMES, Feb. 7, 2003, at 1.
2. Microsoft Patents Ones, Zeroes, THE ONION (Mar. 25, 1998) at 33-11,
available at http://www.theonion.com/content/node/29130. The Onion is a
satirical newspaper.
3. STAFF OF H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 109TH CONG., PATENT QUALITY
IMPROVEMENT
(Comm.
Print
2005),
available
at
http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/judiciary/hju20709.000/hju20709_1.htm.
4. See, e.g., Editorial, Patent Sanity is Pending, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 4, 2005, at
M.4; see also FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, TO PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE
PROPER BALANCE OF COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY (2003),
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addition to patents that should never have been issued, attempts
by patent holders to extend their rights to devices and services
that bear little or no relationship to their initial patent
application are equally problematic. These overreaching claims
have been made possible because the scope of issued patents is
hopelessly unclear. 5
Technology heavyweights including Intel, Microsoft, and
Oracle argue that although the patent system is the foundation
for the United States’ global leadership position in technological
development, there is a pressing need to restore the balance
between the rights of patent holders and the broader social good
of encouraging innovation. These companies fear that, rather
than encouraging the “progress of science and the useful arts” as
required by the United States Constitution, 6 declining patent
quality and overly broad patent rights are reducing incentives to
invest in manufacturing, research and development. 7 Even
obvious beneficiaries of the patent system, such as IBM, which
receives more U.S. Patents than any other company, strongly
support calls for patent reform. 8
Calls for reform from the technology sector have begun to
resonate in the media and in the Supreme Court; yet efforts in
Congress to implement patent reform legislation have repeatedly
failed. 9 Editorials from several major papers decry that “there’s
something rotten in the U.S. patent system;” 10 “the U.S. patent
system is profoundly flawed;” 11 and that “the nation’s patent
system is a mess.” 12 The Supreme Court has recently heard cases

available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/10/innovationrpt.pdf [hereinafter FTC
REPORT].
5. See infra Part I.
6. The United States Constitution provides Congress with the power “To
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to
Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
Discoveries.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
7. See Patti Waldmeir, Get it Now from Ebay, Hostage to the Patent Trolls,
FIN. TIMES, Mar. 16, 2006, at 15.
8. IBM, PATENT REFORM: IMPROVE QUALITY, REDUCE LITIGATION, AND
ENCOURAGE
INNOVATION,
http://www.ibm.com/ibm/governmentalprograms/ibmpatentreform.pdf; see also,
Brendon Chase, IBM Calls for Patent Reform, ZDNET AUSTRALIA, Apr. 11, 2005,
http://www.zdnet.com.au/news/0,39023165,39187609,00.htm.
9. See infra notes 19-21 and accompanying text.
10. The Problem with Patents, THE WALL ST. J., Mar. 29, 2006 at A18.
11. Editorial, Patent Sanity is Pending, supra note 4.
12. Editorial, U.S. Patent System Has Run Aground, THE BOSTON HERALD,
July 24, 2005, at 26; see also Monopolies of the Mind, THE ECONOMIST, Nov. 13,
2004, at 14.
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on the scope of patent injunctions, 13 the limits of patentable
subject matter, 14 the status of patent rights in antitrust
proceedings, 15 the application of the experimental use doctrine in
clinical trials 16 and future of the Federal Circuit’s “teachingsuggestion-motivation” test in relation to obviousness. 17
In 2005, Congressional Representatives Lamar Smith and
Howard Berman proposed a bi-partisan reform bill that would
have dramatically changed the patent landscape. 18 However,
that bill was shelved at the end of 2005 due to time restrictions
and the failure of the House Judiciary Committee to negotiate a
consensus between technology interests, the pharmaceutical
Undeterred,
industry,
and
independent
inventors. 19
Representative Smith yet again proposed significant changes to
the United States patent system, this time under the rubric of the
Patents Depend on Quality Act of 2006, (“the House Bill”). 20 On
August 3, 2006, Senators Orrin Hatch and Patrick Leahy
introduced an alternative compromise bill intended to bridge the
impasse between various stakeholders (“the Senate Reform
Bill”). 21 Regrettably, both these pieces of legislation were set
aside in late 2006 because of looming mid-term elections in
November of that year.
There is no shortage of ideas as to how to reform the United
States patent system – there may in fact be too many such

13. See, e.g., eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 126 S. Ct. 1837 (2006).
14. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 126 S. Ct. 2921
(2006) (dismissing writ of certiorari as improvidently granted).
15. Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 126 S. Ct. 1281 (2006).
16. Merck KGAA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 545 U.S. 193 (2005).
17. KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 126 S. Ct. 2965 (2006) (granting writ of
certiorari). The Supreme Court heard oral arguments in this case on Tuesday,
November 28, 2006.
18. Patent Reform Act of 2005, H.R. 2795, 109th Cong. (2005) (introduced
June 8, 2005, by Representative Lamar Smith, Chairman of the House
Subcommittee on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property).
19. See,
e.g.,
Patent
Reform
2005
-It
is
Over,
http://patentlaw.typepad.com/patent/2005/12/patent_reform_2.html
(Dec.
8,
2005).
20. The bill was introduced on April 5, 2006. See Representative Howard
Berman, Statement on the Patents Depend on Quality Act of 2006 (Apr. 5, 2006),
available at http://www.house.gov/list/speech/ca28_berman/Patent_Quality.html.
21. See Press Release, Senator Orrin G. Hatch, Hatch Introduces Patent
Reform
Legislation
(Aug.
7,
2006),
available
at
http://hatch.senate.gov/index.cfm?FuseAction=PressReleases.Detail&PressReleas
e_id=1642; Patent Reform Act of 2006, S.3818, 109th Cong. (2006).
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proposals. 22 The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) 23 and the
National Academy of Sciences (NAS) 24 have both issued
comprehensive reports on the subject in the last few years; days,
if not weeks, of congressional hearings have been devoted to
patent reform; and there is an extensive body of law review
literature proposing reforms to the way patents are examined,
changes to substantive patent law doctrines, and structural
reform of patent litigation. 25 However, as the failure of the
Patent Reform Act of 2005 and the House and Senate Patent
Reform Bills of 2006 demonstrate, there may, in fact, be too many
reform proposals currently on the table. Missing from the current
patent reform debate is a rational methodology by which
Congress can prioritize its reform agenda. This article fills that

22. An unrestricted search of the LexisNexis U.S. Law Review Database for
the term “patent” within five words of the term “reform” yields over 700 hits,
restricting that search to the last 5 years yields over 400 hits. Significant
literature in this area includes Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Obvious to Whom?
Evaluating Inventions from the Perspective of PHOSITA, 19 BERKELEY TECH.
L.J. 885 (2004); Joseph Farrell & Robert P. Merges, Incentives to Challenge and
Defend Patents: Why Litigation Won’t Reliably Fix Patent Office Errors and Why
Administrative Patent Review Might Help, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. (2004); Jay P.
Kesan, Carrots and Sticks to Create a Better Patent System, 17 BERKELEY TECH.
L.J. 763 (2002); Jay P. Kesan and Andres A. Gallo, Why ‘Bad’ Patents Survive in
the Market and How Should We Change?—The Private and Social Costs of
Patents, 55 EMORY L.J. 61 (2006); F. Scott Kieff, The Case for Registering Patents
and the Law and Economics of Present Patent-Obtaining Rules, 45 B.C. L. REV.
55 (2003); Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 NW. U. L.
REV. 1495 (2001); Robert P. Merges, As Many as Six Impossible Patents Before
Breakfast: Property Rights for Business Concepts and Patent System Reform, 14
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 577 (1999); Joseph Scott Miller, Building a Better Bounty:
Litigation-Stage Rewards for Defeating Patents, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 667
(2004); Arti K. Rai, Allocating Power over Fact-Finding in the Patent System, 19
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 907 (2004); Arti K. Rai, Engaging Facts and Policy: A
Multi-Institutional Approach to Patent System Reform, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1035
(2003); John R. Thomas, The Responsibility of the Rulemaker: Comparative
Approaches to Patent Administration Reform, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 727
(2002); John R. Thomas, Collusion and Collective Action in the Patent System: A
Proposal for Patent Bounties, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 305 (2001).
23. FTC REPORT, supra note 4 (providing an analysis of the interaction of
competition and patent law offering ten recommendations for patent system
reform).
24. NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT'L ACADS., A PATENT SYSTEM FOR
THE 21ST CENTURY (Stephen A. Merrill, et al. eds. 2004), available at
http://www.nap.edu/html/patentsystem/0309089107.pdf
[hereinafter
NAS
REPORT]. (The National Academy of Sciences report on the U.S. patent system
was released shortly after the FTC Report and contained seven key
recommendations for reforming the patent system that closely parallel the FTC’s
suggestions).
25. See infra Part I.B.
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gap by proposing a test of differential impact for patent reform. 26
For a reform proposal to have a differential impact on bad patents
it must discourage the acquisition and/or assertion of bad patents
without affecting the value of good patents.
The differential impact approach elucidated in this article
has three distinct advantages over other proffered efforts to
rewrite the patent system from the ground up. First, the
differential impact approach provides a mechanism by which to
evaluate competing claims for legislative resources. This is
significant because without such an approach there is no way to
decide how a reform in relation to patent examination should be
compared to a reform to the structure of patent litigation.
Second, the differential impact approach is an appropriate
response to the empirical uncertainty surrounding optimal patent
scope. Many of the current reform proposals proceed from the
assumption that patents are either too easy to get, or too easy to
enforce – an assumption which is, as yet, unproven. In contrast,
as discussed in detail in Part II of this article, we do know with
some certainty that bad patents are too easy to get and too easy to
enforce. Third, differential impact is consistent with the need to
take the legitimate expectations of current stakeholders into
account.
If the patent system is to continue to fulfill its constitutional
function of promoting rather than hindering innovation, we must
tailor patent reform to address the problems related to bad
patents without unduly prejudicing the interests of the holders of
good patents. Consequently, rather than attempt to strengthen or
weaken the exclusive rights of patent holders across the board,
we believe that highest priority should be given to those reforms
that have a differential impact: i.e. those reforms that are likely
to raise the cost of obtaining or enforcing a bad patent more than
they raise the cost of obtaining or enforcing a good patent. The
failure of the legislative reform efforts thus far underscores the
importance of prioritizing the most important elements of patent
reform – those with differential impact.
The structure of the article is as follows. Part I provides an
introduction to the problems created by bad patents and
introduces the differential impact test for evaluating patent
reform proposals. Part II examines the origin of bad patents and
applies two different economic models to explain their
persistence. The first model focuses on a potential infringer’s
26. See infra Part I.B.
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incentives to challenge a bad patent; the second model focuses on
a patent holder’s incentive to assert a patent. We explain bad
patents as an emergent phenomenon: they are the product of the
apparently low quality of patent examination 27 and the complex,
uncertain, expensive and time-consuming nature of patent
litigation. 28
Part III then assesses the major patent reform proposals
currently under consideration against the test of differential
impact in light of the economic models developed in the previous
section. From this analysis, we conclude that Congress’ highest
priority for patent reform should be the adoption of a system of
post-grant review of patent validity. Post-grant review will have a
differential impact by significantly lowering the cost of
challenging the bad patents. 29 The differential impact test
supports the adoption of post-grant review which will provide a
low cost method of challenging patents which appear highly likely
to be invalid or hyper-asserted. A well designed system of postgrant review will not impose a significant burden on good patent
holders because those few good patents that are occasionally
subject to review are unlikely to be found invalid. Furthermore,
post-grant review will actually benefit good patents by reducing
uncertainty and information asymmetries relating to patent
quality.
Part IV demonstrates that in addition to supporting the idea
of post-grant review in general, the differential impact test may
also be applied to build a better model for post-grant review.
Looking at post-grant review through the lens of differential
impact leads us to propose a system that is very different from
those embodied in current legislative and other proposals. In
short, we propose: (i) adopting a variable presumption of validity
depending on the level of review that a patent has been subject to;
(ii) implementing a multiple stage system of post-grant review
with two distinct stages in order to balance the goal of greater
scrutiny for bad patents with the need to minimize potential
harassment of good patents; and (iii) bringing questions of claim
construction into post-grant review such that both sides of the

27. See infra Part II.A.
28. See infra Part II.B.
29. See infra Part II.C. See generally Stuart J.H. Graham and Dietmar
Harhoff, Can Post Grant Reviews Improve Patent System Design? A Twin Study
of US and European Patents (Governance and the Efficiency of Economic
Systems, Discussion Paper No. 38, 2006), available at http://www.gesy.unimannheim.de/dipa/38.pdf.
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bad patent phenomenon can be addressed. These proposals are all
designed to ensure that post-grant review provides a low cost way
to challenge bad patents, but does not undermine the value of
good patents.
PART I. THE NEED FOR A PRIORITIZING TOOL
A. THE PROBLEM WITH PATENTS
Historically patents were intended to reward research and
innovation; however, in its modern incarnation, the U.S. patent
system creates numerous perverse effects that undermine that
central mission. Some of the more trivial illustrations of the
perversity of the modern patent system include patents such as
the Tarzan Swing Method, 30 the Beerbrella, 31 a Method for
Exercising Your Cat (with a laser pointer), 32 the Hair Comb-Over
Patent, 33 and the Peanut Butter & Jelly Sandwich patent. 34
These patents are silly, but they are typically of little
consequence except to prompt the question, “what else has the
Patent Office been doing?” The real damage to the effectiveness
of the patent system is done by “bad patents” – patents which
either should never have been granted, or are asserted well
beyond their legitimate scope. 35
The danger of bad patents is that they undermine the
incentive function of the patent system. A patent monopoly
imposes costs on third parties who must either license the patent,

30. U.S. Patent No. 6,368,227 Abstract (filed Nov. 17, 2000) (“A method of
swing [ing] on a swing is disclosed, in which a user positioned on a standard
swing suspended by two chains from a substantially horizontal tree branch
induces side to side motion by pulling alternately on one chain and then the
other.”).
31. U.S. Patent No. 6,637,447 Abstract (filed Oct. 19, 2001) (“[a] small
umbrella . . . which may be removably attached to a beverage container in order
to shade the beverage container from the direct rays of the sun.”).
32. U.S. Patent No. 5,443,036 Abstract (filed Nov. 2, 1993) (“A method for
inducing cats to exercise consists of directing a beam of invisible light produced
by a hand-held laser apparatus onto the floor . . . then moving the laser so as to
cause the bright pattern of light to move in an irregular way fascinating to
cats.”).
33. U.S. Patent No. 6,257,248 (filed Dec. 10, 1999) (patent for cutting or
styling hair using scissors or combs in both hands).
34. U.S. Patent No. 6,004,596 (filed Dec. 8, 1997) (“a sealed crustless
sandwich”).
For
many
other
examples
see
freepatentsonline,
http://www.freepatentsonline.com/crazy.html (last visited Jan. 20, 2007).
35. The term “bad patents” is defined more exactly in Part I.B, infra.
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challenge the patent in court, or expend resources to avoid
infringement by designing around the patent. Where patents are
properly granted and properly asserted, the monopoly cost of the
patent holder’s rights and her incentive to invest in innovation
are generally two sides of the same coin. However, the system
creates perverse incentives if all the advantages of a patent
monopoly are in fact available to those who merely industriously
create or collect bad patents, as opposed to those who invest
(directly or indirectly) in innovation. 36 If a baseball player could
get a home run from hitting a foul ball, there would not be much
incentive to try to hit the ball into the field.
Bad patents should not be confused with so-called patent
trolls. 37 Popular and academic discussion of the assertion of
patent rights by non-practicing entities is commonly linked to
questions of patent quality, but the issues of “bad patents” and
“patent trolls” are in fact severable. We are not aware of any
evidence that patent trolls are more likely to have or assert bad
patents than practicing entities. The key argument against
patent trolls is not that their assertions are necessarily invalid,
but rather that they are in a position to negotiate licensing fees
that are grossly out of alignment with their contribution to the
alleged infringer’s product or service. 38 The reforms addressed in
this article do not begin to address that problem, except in so far
as a particular troll is relying on a bad patent. 39
The meritless assertion of patent rights diverts scarce
research and development funding
from engineering to

36. As the NAS notes in its 2004 report, “patents on trivial innovations may
confer market power or allow firms to use legal resources aggressively as a
competitive weapon without consumer benefit.” See NAS REPORT, supra note 24,
at 95.
37. The term “patent troll” was initially coined a lawyer at Intel Corporation
to describe entities “that try to make a lot of money off a patent that they are not
practicing and have no intention of practicing and in most cases never practiced.”
Alan Murray, War on ‘Patent Trolls' May Be Wrong Battle, WALL ST. J., Mar. 22,
2006, at A2. The term is now broadly understood as a derogatory shorthand for
any non-practicing entity that asserts patent rights. See Wikipedia, Patent Troll,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Patent_troll#Definition_and_etymology (last visited
Jan. 20, 2007).
38. See Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup and Royalty
Stacking (2006), (working paper on file with authors.).
39. In spite of its widespread use, the exact definition of the term patent troll
is disputed. See, e.g., Transcript of Oral Argument at 7, lines 4-6, eBay, 126 S.
Ct. 1837 (No. 05-130) (“Well, is the troll the scary thing under the bridge, or is it
a fishing technique?”). Note that § 5 of the Senate Bill attempts to codify an
“apportionment” rule for the calculation of damages for patent infringement that
would reduce the leverage of so-called patent trolls. S. 3818, 109th Cong. § 5
(2006).
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lawyering; it also diverts patent licensing revenue from the
holders of good patents.
A proliferation of unmeritorious
allegations of patent infringement and subsequent litigation is
clearly bad for defendants, but it is also bad for those companies
that have invested in innovation and rely on the patent system to
protect that investment. The aggressive tactics of the bad patent
holders increases the transaction costs for good patent holders
when they wish to signal that their claims of infringement must
be taken seriously.
The availability of robust patent protection acts as a
significant stimulus to investment in research, development, and
innovation. However, when aggressive patent holders can extract
substantial license fees simply through leveraging the
overwhelming costs and delays involved in challenging a patent,
whether good or bad, the incentives to get a good patent are
reduced and the overall burden of the patent system on society is
increased.
Consider the hypothetical example of Carla, a small Internet
retailer. Just before the critical holiday retail season, Carla
receives a letter from a patent licensing firm. The letter states
that the firm is willing to negotiate a license, based on the firm’s
asserted patent rights, concerning a particular aspect of Internetbased shopping cart checkout technology that Carla uses on her
website. The firm offers the license for an annual fee of $50,000.
Carla is suspicious of the validity of the patent because the
claimed invention seems too broad and abstract. She is also
suspicious because the idea of this electronic shopping cart
technology has been in common use for so long that she does not
equate it with patented technology. Armed with these suspicions,
Carla asks Jane, a friendly patent lawyer, for some help. After
reviewing the letter and the patent, Jane offers several pieces of
information and advice: (1) the patent should probably never have
been issued for a number of reasons, most obviously because it
was “anticipated” by an earlier invention that the Patent Office
examiner was not aware of; 40 (2) for $30,000, Carla can get an
opinion letter that says the patent is invalid and that even if it
was valid, she does not infringe it; 41 (3) without such a letter,

40. 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2000) (novelty provisions).
41. AM. INTELLECTUAL PROP. LAW ASSOC., REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC
SURVEY 102 (2005) [hereinafter, AIPLA ECON. SURVEY]. Although the average
cost of a patent opinion from a mid-sized firm is $23,997, prices as high as
$40,000 are not uncommon in areas such as New York City. Id.
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Carla may be liable for treble damages and attorney’s fees for the
entire period since she received the patent holder’s letter if she is
later found to infringe the patent; 42 (4) Carla probably cannot go
to court to have the patent declared invalid because she lacks
standing for declaratory judgment; 43 (5) even if Carla could
persuade a court to hear her case, it would probably cost her
around $650,000 to invalidate the patent (give or take a few
hundred thousand dollars); 44 (6) given that the patent is likely
flawed, Carla could submit it to the Patent Office for an
administrative process known as reexamination based on the
existence of prior art – but if she does, she either won’t be able to
participate meaningfully in that reexamination process, 45 or
worse still, if she loses her reexamination in the Patent Office,
she won’t be able to make the same arguments again in any later
court proceeding. 46 In the end, Jane cheerfully suggests that
Carla should consider paying the $50,000, regardless of the likely
invalidity of the patent.
This is the real perversity of the current patent system:
rational actors will pay licensing fees for patents they strongly
suspect are either invalid, or simply do not apply to them,
because each of the alternatives is worse.

42. See Knorr-Bremse Systeme Fuer Nutzfahrzeuge GmbH v. Dana Corp.,
383 F.3d 1337, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2004). The remedy for willful infringement is
based on 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2000) (“the court may increase the damages up to three
times the amount found or assessed”) and 35 U.S.C. § 285 (2000) (“the court in
exceptional cases may award reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party”).
43. Vermeer Mfg. Co. v. Deere & Co., 379 F. Supp. 2d 645 (D. Del. 2005)
(patent holder did not create a reasonable apprehension of suit through a letter
stating that the patent holder would enforce its patent rights and that the
opposing party appeared to infringe on the patent). However, the recent
Supreme Court decision in MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc may signal the
immergence of a more flexible doctrine relating to requirements in patent cases.
127 S. Ct. 764 (2007) (holding that the requirements of a case or controversy are
met where payment of a claim is demanded as of right and where payment is
made, but where the involuntary or coercive nature of the exaction preserves the
right to recover the sums paid or to challenge the legality of the claim.)
44. AIPLA ECON. SURVEY, supra note 41, at 108.
45. The Patent Act provides for both ex parte reexaminations under 35
U.S.C. § 302 (2000) and inter partes reexamination under 35 U.S.C. § 311 (2000).
The Act also provides for Commissioner ordered reexaminations under 35 U.S.C.
§ 303(a) (2000). See generally UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE,
REPORT
TO
CONGRESS
ON
INTER
PARTES
REEXAMINATION,
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/dcom/olia/reports/reexam_report.htm
(last
visited Jan. 20, 2007).
46. The Patent Act provides that any issue raised by a challenger during
reexamination cannot be revisited in a later trial involving that challenger. See
35 U.S.C. § 317 (2000). See also Farrell & Merges, supra note 22, at 967.
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B. A DIFFERENTIAL IMPACT ON BAD PATENTS
Congress faces a dizzying array of options when it comes to
overhauling the patent system, but what is lacking from the
patent reform debate so far is a framework for prioritizing these
reforms. This article addresses that need by proposing that
Congress should apply the differential impact test to determine
which reforms are most pressing. We argue that the highest
priority for patent reform should be reserved for those measures
that will have a differential impact on bad patents. This raises
two questions: first, what is it about a patent that makes it bad;
and second, what is differential impact?
1. Defining Bad Patents
For all the discussion of falling patent quality and
opportunistic litigation, there appears to be no agreed-upon
definition of what makes a patent “bad.” The term is often used
loosely to denote patents that should not have been issued. 47
Patents can fail to meet the standards of patentability despite
being issued by the Patent Office. 48 Currently, roughly half of all
litigated patent claims are found invalid by the courts for reasons
such as anticipation or obviousness. 49 Are all of these patents
“bad”? We doubt it. Defining bad patents solely with reference to
standards of patentability is problematic. For example, it is not
uncommon for a patent to be found to be invalid on the basis of
prior art that the applicant could not reasonably be expected to
have known about. 50 Similarly, the uncertain nature of claim
47. See, e.g., Edward Hsieh, Note, Mandatory Joinder: An Indirect Method
for Improving Patent Quality, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 683 (2004) (defining bad patents
as “patents that do not meet the statutory requirements of novelty and
nonobviousness.”); see also Katharine M. Zandy, Too Much, Too Little, or Just
Right? A Goldilocks Approach to Patent Reexamination Reform, 61 N.Y.U. ANN.
SURV. AM. L. 865, 905 (defining bad patents as “patents that are likely to be
invalidated if subjected to litigation or an administrative challenge.) Jay Kesan
offers a more helpful definition; he uses the term as follows: “a patent is “bad” if
it should not have been granted by the Patent Office after a reasonable search
and review of the relevant prior art.” See Kesan , supra note 22.
48. Primarily novelty, 35 U.S.C. § 102, non-obviousness, 35 U.S.C. § 103, and
written description, enablement and best mode, 35 U.S.C. § 112.
49. John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, Empirical Evidence on the Validity of
Litigated Patents, 26 AIPLA Q.J. 185, 205-206 (1998) (reporting that, in a sample
of 300 cases, only 54% of final validity decisions found the patent valid. This
analysis is at the patent level, not the claim level but the authors of this study
treat cases with split rulings on claim validity as two separate patents).
50. See, e.g., In re Hall, 781 F.2d 897, 898-899 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (holding that
a single copy of a doctoral thesis, properly cataloged in the collection of a German
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construction makes predicting the ultimate validity of any patent
claim a speculative art at best. 51 For these reasons we believe
that it would be over-inclusive to define bad patents as those
patents that should not have been issued given the wisdom of
hindsight. Clearly, part of the definition of bad patents must
encompass patents that a reasonably diligent applicant would
have known failed to meet the statutory requirements of
patentability. But such patents are merely the beginning of the
bad patent phenomenon.
As an alternative to defining bad patents simply as invalid
patents, we propose a functionalist definition of bad patents that
focuses more clearly on those patents which are likely to distort
the allocation of resources. The British Telecom (“BT”) hyperlink
patent provides a good example of a different kind of bad patent.
In 2002, telecommunications giant BT attempted to assert patent
rights over the creation of hyperlinks on the Internet. One of the
many striking things about BT’s claims was that this patent was
initially filed in 1976 52 , well before the technology they effectively
claimed to own was invented. 53 BT’s U.S. Patent No. 4,873,662,
eventually issued in 1989, describes a system where multiple
users can access data on a central computer by using remote
terminals. BT claimed that this patent read on the technology
used in Internet hyperlinks. BT contacted various Internet
Service Providers (“ISP”) and demanded license fees, claiming
that the ISP’s actions facilitated the infringement of the patent by
providing ISP subscribers with access to the Internet. When
eventually challenged in federal court, BT’s infringement claims
were dismissed on summary judgment, with the judge holding
that no reasonable jury could have found that the scope of the
patent’s claims covered Internet hyperlinks. 54 While the bad

University Library qualified as anticipating prior art).
51. See Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., 138 F.3d 1448, 1476 (Fed. Cir. 1998)
(Rader, J., dissenting) (noting that almost 40% of all district court claim
constructions appealed to the Federal Circuit since Markman I were reversed);
see also Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (Mayer, J.,
dissenting) (Describing the process of claim construction as mayhem); Lava
Trading, Inc. v. Sonic Trading Mgmt., LLC, 445 F.3d 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2006)
(Mayer, J., dissenting).
52. That is, the U.S. patent claimed priority from a July 20, 1976 United
Kingdom filing.
53. See Kurt Kleiner, BT in Court to Enforce Hyperlink Patent, NEW
SCIENTIST,
February
11,
2002,
available
at
http://www.newscientist.com/article.ns?id=dn1905; U.S. Patent No. 4,873,662
(filed Aug. 15, 1980).
54. British Telecomms. PLC v. Prodigy Commc’ns Corp., 217 F. Supp. 2d
399, 401 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
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patent assertions by BT were eventually removed from the
marketplace, they were still able to cause significant financial
harm before they were formally rejected.
As the litigation over the BT Hyperlink patent illustrates,
even a technically valid patent can become a bad patent if it is
asserted beyond its legitimate scope. The BT Hyperlink patent
may well have been properly granted; however, it was the broad
assertion of rights by BT that made the hyperlink patent a bad
patent. 55
In sum, the term bad patent should be used to identify not
only invalid patents, but also patents that are asserted (by
implication or otherwise) to cover a product or activity that no
reasonable fact finder in possession of all the relevant facts could
find that they covered. The reason for adopting this functionalist
definition of bad patents is that we are less concerned about
whether a patent turns out to be technically valid, and more
concerned about whether it is used as the basis for an assertion of
rights that is objectively lacking in merit. A patent that should
not have been issued and a patent that was validly issued but is
now the subject of hyper-assertion both result in the patent
holder claiming legal rights she does not in fact possess. These
are the patents that undermine the incentive rationale of the
patent system.
2. Differential Impact
In his seminal 1958 review of the economic literature relating
to the patent system, economist Fritz Machlup concluded that:
No economist, on the basis of present knowledge, could possibly state
with certainty that the patent system, as it now operates, confers a net
benefit or a net loss upon society. . . . If we did not have a patent system,
it would be irresponsible, on the basis of our present knowledge of its
economic consequences, to recommend instituting one. But since we
have had a patent system for a long time, it would be irresponsible, on
the basis of our present knowledge, to recommend abolishing it. 56

Machlup was not suggesting that there is no evidence as to
whether the patent system has costs or benefits, but rather that
55. On this theory, the patent did not become “bad” until BT argued for a
claim construction that was unsupported by the actual invention.
56. FRITZ MACHLUP, AN ECONOMIC REVIEW OF THE PATENT SYSTEM,
SUBCOMM. ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND COPYRIGHTS OF THE SENATE COMM.
ON THE JUDICIARY, Study No 15, 85th Cong, 2d Sess. at 79 (1958).
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there is substantial conflicting evidence as to the magnitudes of
those costs and benefits. Scholars generally agree that we are
empirically uncertain about far too many things to know whether
expanding or contracting scope or availability of patent rights will
be beneficial. 57 The interesting question is what we should do in
the face of this uncertainty. Machlup himself saw no reason why
uncertainty should lead to policy paralysis. He argued that
regardless of the global uncertainty in relation to the patent
system, “the student of the economics . . . need not disqualify
himself as a judge of proposed changes in the existing system. . . .
a team of well-trained economic researchers and analysts should
be able to obtain enough information to reach competent
conclusions on questions of patent reform.” 58
One of the most pressing problems in the patent system
today is not that patents in general are too easy to obtain or too
easy to enforce; rather it is that bad patents are too easy to obtain
and enforce. The solution to this problem is not to simply make
all patents less valuable. Rather, the solution is to try and reform
the system so that bad patents are more easily weeded out
without undue prejudice to good patents. Ideally, any change to
the current patent system must benefit companies that have
invested in innovation and use valid patents to protect that
investment; it certainly should not harm them. In order to
achieve this, we argue that the reform proposals garnering
congressional attention should be uniformly assessed against a
test of differential impact. The strong form of this test is that a
reform must reduce the incentives for obtaining or asserting bad
patents without reducing those same incentives for good patents.
The weak form of the differential impact test simply requires that
a reform reduce the incentives for obtaining or asserting bad
patents more than it reduces those same incentives for good
patents.
The differential impact test is necessary because of the
empirical uncertainty as to the optimum scope of patent rights
and because of the need for a targeted legislative proposal that
might have a better chance of being passed by Congress. There
are many reform proposals that might make sense if we were
rebuilding the patent system from the ground up, but, if we are
pursuing less radical change, we must keep in mind the
expectations of those individuals and corporations who have

57. See Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of
Patent Scope, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 839 (1990).
58. MACHLUP, supra note 56.
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already invested in the current system.
The objective of this article is to explain the need for
differential impact analysis of patent reform and to evaluate the
current reform proposals against that test. However, in order to
make that possible, it is first necessary to understand why the
Patent Office issues invalid patents and how bad patents
continue to survive in the market place once they have been
issued. Accordingly, the next Part explores the origin and
survival of bad patents.
PART II. THE ORIGIN AND SURVIVAL OF BAD PATENTS
Congressional action on patent reform should be targeted
toward implementing those reforms that are most likely to have a
differential impact on bad patents, that is, those reforms that will
reduce the value of bad patents without undermining the value of
good patents. In order to examine which reforms are most likely
to have a differential impact on bad patents it is first necessary to
understand why, in spite of its best efforts, the Patent Office
continues to issue invalid and ill-defined patents and how those
patents are used in the marketplace. In this section we use two
different economic models to explain why some patent holders see
value in asserting patent rights that no reasonable judge or jury
would ultimately vindicate. These models also suggest which
reforms are most likely to reduce this kind of activity without
damaging the legitimate interests of good patent holders.
A. PATENT EXAMINATION
The phenomenon of bad patents stems from both the
apparent low quality of patent examination and the complex,
uncertain, expensive and time-consuming nature of patent
litigation. It is important to understand the relationship between
these two factors. If only an insignificant number of patents were
improperly issued, it would not matter very much that patent
litigation was so expensive. In this scenario, only good patents
would be issued and the burden of expensive patent litigation
would fall largely on infringers with a real case to answer.
Similarly, if challenging invalid patents was simple, quick, and
cheap, it would not matter if there were vast numbers of
improperly issued patents. In this alternative scenario, alleged
infringers would be able to quickly ascertain the likely merits of
the patent holder’s claim by attempting to invalidate the patent.
Knowing that alleged infringers will routinely test the quality of
patents, patent holders would have a strong incentive to only
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make defensible claims of infringement. In contrast with the
foregoing scenarios, the problems with the current patent system
arise in part because too many potentially bad patents issue, and
in part because it is too costly for alleged infringers to challenge
or test their validity. 59 Accordingly, the problem of bad patents
cannot be understood in one-dimensional terms; it emerges from
the interaction of the features of both patent examination and
patent litigation.
Bad patents emerge from the Patent Office due to a
combination of limited resources and distorted incentives. Almost
any patent lawyer will agree that the U.S. patent system is
currently overburdened: there are too many patent applications
and not enough examiners to ensure that the merits of each and
every patent are properly assessed. In the 2005 fiscal year, the
Patent Office received over 380,000 new patent applications and
issued more than 152,000 patents. 60 Each one of those issued
patents spent an average of two to three years in prosecution. 61
Yet during that time, the average patent was probably only
examined for as little as 18 hours and at most 41.5 hours. 62
The Patent Office currently has 4,200 patent examiners, but
plans to hire 1,000 patent examiners a year for the next several
years to increase its current staff. 63 Even so, given the growth in
the volume of applications over the last two decades and the
likely turnover of examiners at the Patent Office, 64 the office will
59. Patents are potentially rather than categorically “bad” at the time they
are issued because how they will actually be used is not predetermined.
60. These figures relate to utility, plant, and reissue patent applications;
U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, USPTO PERFORMANCE AND
ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2005 18 (2005), available at
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/annual/2005.
61. Id. at 6 (“pendency—the amount of time a patent application is waiting
before a patent is issued—now averages more than two years. In more complex
art areas, such as data-processing technologies, average pendency stands at more
than three years.”); see also Lemley, supra note 22, at 1500.
62. Id. Lemley cites various estimates of the amount of time spent examining
the average patent ranging from eighteen to eight hours. These estimates may be
out of date. According to one examiner, the average initial decision for a digital
camera patent takes about twenty-four hours, to actually finalize the claims and
approve the patent issues presumably takes several additional hours. See Kevin
Maney, Patent Applications So Abundant That Examiners Can't Catch Up, USA
TODAY, Sept. 21, 2005, at B3. We can calculate the upper bound of examination
time by dividing the number of hours worked by examiners by the number of
patents issued every year. Assuming 4200 examiners each allocate 1500 hours a
year to examination yields 6.3 million hours of examination. Dividing this by the
152,000 patents issued in 2005 yields 41.5 hours per patent.
63. Kevin Maney, supra note 62.
64. Patent examiners, on average, spend only three to five years with the
Patent Office before leaving. This means that within a four year period, the

SAG M & ROHDE K. Patent Reform and Differential Impact. MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 2006;8(1):193.

18

MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH.

[Vol. 8:1

likely struggle to keep pace with increasing demands for
examination if no other changes are made to the system. The
mismatch between patent applications and examination resources
has resulted in considerable delays in the time it takes the Patent
Office to issue a patent. 65 The Patent Office currently faces a
backlog as high as 885,000 applications, many of which have not
even been assigned to an examiner. 66 According to its 2005
annual report, the Patent Office estimates the average time it
takes to examine and issue a patent to be about twenty-nine
months, although the figure is much higher in certain fields such
as software and business method patents. 67 Furthermore, the
Patent Office reports that unless reforms are implemented or the
agency’s budget is expanded, the current backlog will increase to
up to five years. 68
As the Patent Office struggles with the availability of
examination resources, it must also face the recent extension of
patentable subject matter into new fields. In the past twenty-five
years, legal and technological changes have combined to radically
extend the application of the patent system to new areas,
including software, business methods, and genomics. 69
These new frontiers of patentability have increased the strain
on the Patent Office in two ways. First, increasingly permissive

equivalent of the entire current staff of examiners at the Patent Office will have
left. This points to both a continuing problem of staffing levels and also a
problem with retention of experienced examiners. See Randy Barrett, Report:
Patent Office Should Become Federal Corporation, NAT’L J. TECH. DAILY, Aug. 24
2005, available at http://www.govexec.com/dailyfed/0805/082405td1.htm.
65. The Patent Office allegedly told an applicant for a business method
patent that its recently filed application might take as long as fourteen years to
be examined. See PTO: First Office Action Expected Fall 2019,
http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2006/06/pto_first_offic.html (2006).
66. Tricia Bishop, 43.5-Month Patent Process Not Moving Fast Enough, THE
BALTIMORE SUN, Apr. 30, 2006, at 4C. (The increase has led to the fear that some
patents, despite the time frame, are being granted without proper review). Victor
Godinez, Patent System Under Scrutiny BlackBerry Case Highlights Complaints,
Backlog of Applications, THE DALLAS MORNING NEWS, March 26, 2006. (The
agency has a backlog of nearly 600,000 patent applications, and the stack is
growing).
67. Id. (It takes an average of more than three years – 43.5 months, to be
exact – for the government to process a software patent application.).
68. See John W. Schoen, U.S. Patent Office Swamped By Backlog, Without
More Funding, Wait Time Could Top 5 Years, MSNBC, Apr. 27, 2004,
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/4788834/ (quoting Jon W. Dudas).
69. See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 5,193,056 (filed Mar. 11, 1991) (first business
method patent, ruled patentable subject matter in State Street Bank & Trust Co.
v. Signature Financial Group, 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998)).
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rules on patentable subject matter have led to a deluge of patent
applications in those fields. 70 Second, new subject matter patents
are more difficult for the Patent Office to examine because they
cannot simply turn to previously published patents to begin the
search for prior art. Furthermore, patent examiners are at a
comparative disadvantage in reviewing new technology because
they cannot readily access outside expertise without violating the
confidentiality of the patent applicant. 71 Even more remarkably,
patent examiners in many art areas are prohibited from
searching on Google and other Internet search engines to search
for prior art references. 72 In response to vigorous criticism of its
treatment of new subject matter, the Patent Office instituted new
policies in 2000 and 2001 designed to improve patent quality in
some areas. 73 However, the impact of the Patent Office’s new
policies has thus far been difficult to judge.
In addition, the Patent Office has been affected by
“technology creep.” 74 Old classifications such as electrical,
chemical, and mechanical inventions have been displaced by far
more complex fields like semiconductors, biotechnology, and
nanotechnology, all of which require far more specialized
expertise.
Even taking into account its limited resources, the Patent
Office has been criticized for simply being too willing to grant
patents. Arguably, the Patent Office’s internal culture and
organization predispose examiners to granting patents too easily.
Factors that might contribute to a culture of permissive patent
issuance include: (1) patent examiners face no penalties for
issuing ultimately bad patents; 75 (2) patent examiners are only

70. Jennifer A. Albert & Emerson V. Briggs, III, Strategies of Tech Business
Include Utility Patents, NAT'L L.J., Jan. 29, 2001, at B23 (reporting that “the
PTO has been inundated with patent applications during the past two years and
can barely keep up. It is generally understood that this increase in filings results
from an influx of computer, software, and Internet-based applications in the
wake of the Federal Circuit's holding in State Street.”).
71. See Beth Novak, Peer to Patent: Collective Intelligence and Intellectual
Property Reform, (working paper on file with the authors 2006).
72. Id.
73. See NAS REPORT, supra note 24, at 55–56.
74. See Schoen, supra note 68.
75. John R. Thomas, The Responsibility of the Rulemaker: Comparative
Approaches to Patent Administration Reform, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 727, 733
(2001) (“Courts do not fine the USPTO upon invalidating a patent; the examiners
who allowed the case are not disciplined for their oversight; nor must the USPTO
award damages to affected members of the public to compensate for an
improvidently granted patent. The costs of failing to acquire information are
simply shifted to other actors - in particular, the federal courts, the patentee's
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rewarded for initial response to, and final determinations of,
patent applications; 76 and (3) continuation, continuation-in-part,
and divisional applications can be used to wear down an
examiner until at least some claims issue. 77
The imperfect nature of patent examination is widely
acknowledged. Even the Patent Office acknowledges that its error
rate is around 4%, 78 although many scholars believe that number
to be much, much higher. 79
The FTC reports that the Patent Office’s approval rate might
be as high as 98%. 80 This is compared with a 67% approval rate
in Europe and 64% in Japan. 81 The Patent Office argues that the
true figure is more like a 75% approval rate or even a 60% rate. 82
However, other studies that account for the effect of
continuations, continuations-in-part, and divisional applications
estimate the Patent Office’s approval rate to be much higher. 83
Whatever the reasons for the Patent Office’s high rate of
allowance might be, the fact that persistent applicants are almost
always successful does not indicate a high threshold of quality
competitors, and, ultimately, consumers.”)
76. John R. Allison et al., Valuable Patents, 92 GEO. L.J. 435, 463 (2004).
77. Id. at 456-57.
78. U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, PERFORMANCE AND
ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2002 18 (2005), available at
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/annual/2002/1-58.pdf (showing an official
“error rate,” based on internal quality assurance measures, of 4.2%. An error is
defined as at least one claim within the randomly selected allowed application
under quality review that would be held invalid in a court of law, if the
application were to issue as a patent without the required correction. Some
examples of errors include the issuance of a claim having anticipatory prior art
under 35 U.S.C. § 102, or relevant prior art under 35 U.S.C. § 103 that would
render the allowed claim obvious. Other errors include lack of compliance of the
claim to the other statutory requirements (e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 101, 35 U.S.C. § 112)
and judicially created doctrines. The error rate is the ratio of patents issued with
errors to the total number of patents issued).
79. Allison & Lemley, supra note 49, at 205-206 (only 54% of the patents
were found valid in a population of 300 final validity decisions). While this is
may be in line with standard assumptions about the selection of disputes for
litigation, the difference with patents is that they have previously been subject to
a review process before entering the pool for selection.
80. See FTC REPORT, supra note 4, at 217.
81. Id.
82. Id. (75% approval rate); USPTO Director Jon Dudas, Address at 2005
AIPLA Meeting (Oct. 28, 2005).
83. C. Quillen and O. Webster, Continuing Patent Applications and
Performance of the U.S. Patent Office, 11 FED. CIR. B.J. 1, 5 (2001) (finding that
the Grant Rate for the PTO in fiscal years 1993-1998, corrected for continuing
applications, ranges from 80% to 97%).
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control.
The important policy question that flows from the imperfect
nature of patent examination is whether it is worth spending
money to make patent examination any better. Patent lawyers
and a number of academics have called for better funding for the
Patent Office to improve patent examination. 84 In contrast,
somewhat like Dr. Strangelove, 85 a few commentators have
suggested giving up worrying about the issuance of invalid and
uncertain patents and learning to love a system of quick-anddirty examination at the Patent Office – the theory being that
poor quality patents will either be ignored by the market or dealt
with through litigation. 86 As Mark Lemley explains:
[S]ociety ought to resign itself to the fact that bad patents will issue, and
attempt to deal with the problem ex post, if the patent is asserted in
litigation. This result is admittedly counterintuitive. It depends crucially
on the fact that very few patents are ever the subject of litigation, or
even licensing. Because of this, money spent improving the [Patent
Office] examination procedures will largely be wasted on examining the
ninety-five percent of patents that will either never be used, or will be
used in circumstances that don’t crucially rely on the determination of
validity. 87

Although the “rational ignorance” theory of patent
examination is attractive, its advantages may be overstated.
There are a number of reasons to suspect that bad patents are not
effectively dealt with by market and judicial forces, as explained
in more detail in the next section.
B. THE PERSISTENCE OF BAD PATENTS
There would be no need to worry about improving patent

84. Legislation has even been proposed to this end. See United States Patent
and Trademark Fee Modernization Act of 2005, H.R.2791, 109th Cong. (2005).
85. DR. STRANGELOVE OR: HOW I LEARNED TO STOP WORRYING AND LOVE
THE BOMB (Hawk Films Ltd. 1964).
86. Lemley, supra note 22, at 1497; see also Allison, supra note 76; Kieff,
supra note 22 (arguing that patent applications should be registered, not
examined).
87. Lemley, supra note 22, at 1510-11; see also, Farrell & Merges, supra note
22, at 946 (“It would be a disgrace for a system to enforce a lot of improper
patents. This need not mean that it is bad if the USPTO issues a lot of invalid
patents. Rather, the entire system of application, examination, issuance,
negotiation, licensing, challenge, and enforcement should be evaluated as a
whole.”). Lemley clearly recognizes that some examination related reforms are
worth pursuing, id. at 1523-25, but his main contention is that the primary
reform goal should be “to strengthen the validity inquiry made by the trial
courts.” Id. at 1532. Critical responses to Lemley’s “rational ignorance” theory
include Shubha Ghosh & Jay Kesan, What Do Patents Purchase? In Search of
Optimal Ignorance in the Patent Office, 40 HOUS. L. REV. 1219 (2004).
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examination if potential infringers were able to instantly
recognize bad patents when they saw them and if patent holders
viewed attempting to extract revenue based on such patents as a
futile exercise. However, in reality invalid and hyper-asserted
patents are capable of generating significant revenues and thus
have a distorting effect on the allocation of resources in the
economy. Indeed, as this section explains, the delay, uncertainty,
and expense of patent litigation mean that alleged infringers
have weak incentives to challenge bad patents and also that
patent holders have strong incentives to over-claim their rights.
Understanding these incentives is central to determining which
proposed reforms are likely to have a differential impact on bad
patents.
1. Weak Incentives to Challenge
Faced with the threat of litigation from the holder of a
questionable patent, an alleged infringer must choose whether to
pay the license fees the patent holder demands, challenge the
validity or application of the patent, or simply exit the market. 88
One of the central problems with the current patent system is
that there are many circumstances in which these choices will be
dictated by the cost of litigation, not the validity of the patent
holder’s claims. In fact, the models discussed in this section
demonstrate that as the cost of litigation increases, the validity of
the asserted patent becomes less and less relevant to the alleged
infringer’s decision to challenge.
Both Farrell and Merges and Kesan and Gallo have
developed formal models to determine whether litigation will
adequately deal with the problem of bad patents. 89 Their models
are developed from the point of view of a potential defendant who
is faced with the choice of licensing, ignoring, or challenging a
88. Exiting the market may mean that the alleged infringer abandons a line
of business altogether or designs around the patent (thus exiting the patent
market, but not the product market).
89. See, e.g., Kesan & Gallo, supra note 22, at 85; Farrell & Merges, supra
note 22, at 943 (arguing that litigation is an poor substitute for adequate patent
examination and calling for greater funding for the Patent Office to improve
patent review at the application stage); see also Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro,
Probabilistic Patents, 19 J. ECON. PERSP. 76 (2005) (exploring the suboptimal
incentives of private parties to challenge patents in courts and considering
potential reforms); Miller, supra note 22, at 667 (proposing a regime of litigationstage bounties to encourage defendants to challenge patent validity); Edward
Hsieh, Note, Mandatory Joinder: An Indirect Method for Improving Patent
Quality, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 683 (2004) (proposing a mandatory joinder solution).
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patent holder’s assertion that some aspect of her business
infringes on the patent holder’s rights. We present here our own
version of the challenger focused model which illustrates why
alleged infringers will pay license fees rather than challenge bad
patents in a significant number of cases.
2. Challenger Focused Model
The challenger focused model (“CF-model”) described in this
section looks at the world from the perspective of a potential
infringer who has received some indication that a patent holder
believes she is infringing and has demanded a royalty payment
accordingly. The alleged infringer must decide whether to take a
license, challenge the patent, or exit the field.
Variable Definitions:
π

=

Profit to the potential infringer over
the lifetime of the product (excluding
any costs relating to the patent)
Cost of license payments.

CL

=

CP

=

Additional penalty cost of license
payments after challenging the patent
and losing.

L

=

Cost of legal challenge.

I

=

Cost of gathering information related
to patent validity.

P

=

Cost of any damages as a result of
losing a challenge to the patent.

Α

=

Probability that the alleged infringer
would be able to successfully
challenge the patent.

Utility Functions:
UWin
ULose
ULicense
UExit
UChallenge

=
=
=
=
=

π–L–I
π – L – I – CL – CP – P
π – CL – I
0
α (UWin) + (1– α) (ULose)

When faced with the scenario above, the alleged infringer of a
potentially bad patent will decide whether to challenge the
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patent, take a license, or exit the field based on which is least
costly or most profitable. Generally, an alleged infringer will
challenge the patent if her utility from doing so exceeds her
utility from simply accepting the license demands of the patent
holder, i.e., UChallenge > ULicense. However, if either challenging the
patent or accepting the license would drive the alleged infringer
out of business, that is, UChallenge< 0 and ULicense< 0, then the
alleged infringer will simply exit the field. There are a number of
different ways in which patent holders can obtain value from an
individual patent or from a portfolio of patents: (1) they can use
patents to exclude competitors from certain markets and thus
charge higher prices (the exclusive strategy), (2) they can use the
threat of exclusion to extract license fees (the extractive strategy),
(3) they can use the threat of retaliatory litigation to avoid paying
license fees for activity that infringes on the patent rights of
another party (the defensive strategy), or (4) they can pursue a
combination of these strategies. These diverse applications can be
accounted for in the model by simply treating all patent holders
as being extractive, but acknowledging that exclusive and
defensive patent holders charge different kinds of prices. In effect,
exclusive patent holders charge royalties that no potential
infringer could afford to pay. Similarly, defensive patent holders
charge royalties denominated in the royalties they do not pay for
other people’s patents. On the other hand, extractive patent
holders would prefer to get some direct revenue from their
licensing targets and so will price their royalties such that at
least some potential infringers can afford to pay them.
The CF-model holds that an alleged infringer will challenge
the patent holder by contesting either the validity or the
applicability of the patent where her utility from doing so exceeds
her utility of simply accepting the license demands of the patent
holder.
Challenge if:
UChallenge > ULicense
This inequality can be expanded as follows:
α (UWin) + (1– α) (ULose) > π – CL – I
α (π – L – I) + (1– α) (π – L – I – CL – CP – P) > π – CL – I
Expanding and restating in terms of L yields:
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L < αCL + (1-α) (CP + P)
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(Equation 1)

In words, the model shows that an alleged infringer will
challenge the patent holder if the cost of litigation (L) is less than
the probability of winning (α) times the cost of the license plus the
probability of losing (1-α) multiplied by the penalties associated
with an unsuccessful challenge to the patent, such as increased
royalty rates and enhanced damages for willful infringement (CP
+ P).
Comparative Statics
This yields useful comparative statics. 90 As the probability of
winning approaches total certainty, i.e., α → 1, the alleged
infringer will challenge if litigation costs are less than the cost of
licensing.
Challenge if: L < CL as α → 1

(Comparative Static 1)

This makes sense intuitively. As successfully challenging the
patent becomes more likely, the costs of an unsuccessful challenge
become less important. An interesting result from Comparative
Static 1 is that the alleged infringer’s potential profit appears to
have disappeared from the equation. But in actual fact, the
alleged infringer’s potential profit is still significant as
determinant of CL, i.e., CL = f(π). It is difficult to estimate what
the average patent license demand is, but anecdotal evidence
suggests that it is significantly less than the minimum threshold
costs of patent litigation. Probably the most plausible method of
valuing intellectual property is known as the “income approach,”
which views the value of an asset in terms of the present value of
the future stream of economic benefits that can be derived from
its ownership. 91 Under this method, royalty rates are directly tied
to the profits of the alleged infringer. 92 In practice, patent license

90. Comparative statics is a modeling technique used in economics and
political science. Comparative statics is the formal study of how the equilibrium
or optimal values of the variables in a model are affected by changes in the
values of other parameters in the model. See KEVIN M. CURRIER, COMPARATIVE
STATICS ANALYSIS IN ECONOMICS (2000).
91. See Russell L. Parr & Gordon V. Smith, Quantitative Methods of Valuing
Intellectual Property, in THE NEW ROLE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN
COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS 58, 68 (Melvin Simensky & Lanning G. Bryer eds.,
1994).
92. Reasonable royalties are usually determined by the application of the
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fees are frequently determined by seemingly arbitrary rules of
thumb such as the “25 Percent Rule” or reference to past industry
practices. 93 Each of these methods is something of a
“guesstimate” 94 but it seems fair to assume that methods of
valuation that were not a function of the alleged infringer’s
potential profit would be displaced in the market by those that
were.
Although the cost of a patent license and the potential profit
of the alleged infringer are closely tied, litigation costs are only
weakly related to the alleged infringer’s potential profit.
According to a recent survey conducted by the American
Intellectual Property Law Association, litigating an individual
patent case is likely to cost around $650,000 for a low valued
patent and up to $4.5 million for a higher value patent. 95 It is not
surprising that parties in high stakes cases would spend more
than those in lower stakes cases, but it is significant to note that
litigation costs are largely insensitive to the amount in dispute
below a certain threshold. 96
The stickiness of the lower boundary of litigation costs means
that although licensing costs will be directly related to the alleged
infringer’s profit potential, litigation costs will not. For example, a
“Georgia Pacific Factors.” See Ga. Pac. v. U.S. Plywood, 318 F. Supp. 1116
(S.D.N.Y. 1970); see also F. Russell Denton & Paul J. Heald, Random Walks,
Non-Cooperative Games, and the Complex Mathematics of Patent Pricing, 55
RUTGERS L. REV. 1175, 1191 (2003).
93. Denton & Heald, supra note 92, at 1190-93. The “25 Percent Rule” is the
popular license valuation method which holds that a licensee should pay a
royalty equivalent to 25% of the expected profit from the product that
incorporates the patent being licensed. Ted Hagelin, Valuation of Patent
Licenses, 12 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 423, 424 (2004).
94. Denton & Heald, supra note 92, at 1191 (citing Robert S. Bramson,
Valuing Patents, Technologies and Portfolios: Rules of Thumb, 635 PLI/PAT 465,
471 (2001)).
95. AIPLA ECON. SURVEY, supra note 41, at 22. For a patent valued at less
than $1 million over its life, the cost of discovery alone approaches $350,000. Id.
For patents valued between $1 million and $25 million, the average costs rise to
$1.25 million for discovery and $2 million for complete litigation. Id. For those
patents which exceed $25 million in value, costs average $3 million for discovery
and $4.5 million for litigation. Id. See also Bronwyn H. Hall et al., Prospects for
Improving U.S. Patent Quality Via Post-Grant Opposition 8 (Nat’l Bureau of
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 9731, 2003), available at
http://papers.nber.org/papers/W9731.pdf (estimating legal costs of patent
litigation ranging between $500,000 to $3 million dollars per suit or $500,000 per
claim at issue per side).
96. Anecdotal evidence suggests that it costs about the same to litigate a $1
million patent suit as it does for a patent suit where the amount at stake is only
$500,000.
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potential infringer contemplating challenging the validity of a
patent has to expect that her litigation costs will amount to at
least around $500,000, 97 assuming that her profit is a mere $1
million and that a 5% royalty is customary in her industry. She
has to weigh that $500,000 litigation bill against a license
demand of only $50,000. By way of counter-example, if a potential
infringer had an expected profit of $10 million, a 5% royalty
would lead to a license demand of $500,000, roughly the same
value as the cost of litigation. The alleged infringer is far more
likely to litigate in the second scenario than in the first.
The fact that only a small proportion of patent cases actually
end in a trial on the merits should not make us any more
comfortable with the high cost of patent litigation. In their recent
empirical study of the resolution of patent cases from 1995 to
2000, Kesan and Ball find that between four and seven percent of
cases end with a final judgment in one form or other. 98 However,
the authors also find that a further seven to eight percent of cases
are disposed of through summary judgment. The high cost of
patent litigation might be less concerning if those cases that
ended in summary judgment were considerably cheaper, but the
evidence shows that they are not. For example, examining patent
cases filed in 1997, Kesan and Ball find that the average duration
of cases that terminated through a trial was just under two-anda-half years while cases from the same year that terminated
through a successful summary judgment ended only about two
months sooner. 99 This indicates that the high cost of patent
litigation is not merely a factor in those rare cases that make it
all the way to a final judgment; it also affects those cases in which
the defendant is able to win on summary judgment.
The inflexible nature of litigation costs at the lower boundary
also means that the majority of patent holder assertions will
result in licensing costs that are far less than the lower boundary
of litigation, as illustrated in Graph 1. This graph depicts a
density function of the distribution of potential patent cases in
relation to the difference between litigation costs and licensing
costs (CL – L). 100 We suggest that the vast majority of potential
infringers will face litigation costs that exceed licensing costs as

97. AIPLA ECON. SURVEY, supra note 41, at 22.
98. Jay P. Kesan, & Gwendolyn G. Ball, How Are Patent Cases Resolved? An
Empirical Examination of the Adjudication and Settlement of Patent Disputes, 84
WASH. L. REV. 237, 265-69 (2006).
99. Id. at 64.
100. The density function depicted here is merely illustrative; profit is not
necessarily normally distributed.
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represented by the shaded area on the left-hand side of the
density function in the graph below.

GRAPH 1: POTENTIAL INFRINGERS AND THE DIFFERENCE
BETWEEN LITIGATION AND LICENSING COSTS

0

0

CL – L

CL – L

Because the majority of patent holder assertions will result
in licensing costs that are far less than the lower boundary of
litigation, the probability that an alleged infringer will challenge
any given patent assertion is effectively zero in a large number of
cases. 101 Recall that the Comparative Static 1 indicated that as
the probability of success approaches one, an alleged infringer
would challenge if litigation costs were less than licensing costs.
Graph 2 maps the predicted outcomes for a continuum of π given
the distribution assumptions in Graph 1.

101. Admittedly, some potential infringers may challenge in such a situation
if they have a strong reputation interest in not being seen to be an easy target.
Nonetheless, the simplified parameters of the CF-model probably capture the
behavior of a majority of firms.
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GRAPH 2: PROBABILITY OF CHALLENGE
Probability of
Challenge
1

0
π

The result depicted in Graph 1 reflects anecdotal experience:
at low levels of profit challenge is unlikely; at high levels of profit,
challenge is very likely; there is a very small transition window in
between where the probability of success is relevant to the alleged
infringer’s determination.
C. IMPLICATIONS OF THE CHALLENGER FOCUSED MODEL
The CF-model has at least six significant implications with
respect to the survival of bad patents. These implications are: (1)
the probability of successfully challenging the patent holder’s
assertion is only a significant determinant of whether an alleged
infringer will challenge in a limited range of cases, (2) high
litigation costs insulate bad patents from challenge, (3) the
uncertainties of patent litigation insulate bad patents from
challenge, (4) information asymmetries insulate bad patents from
challenge, (5) challenges to bad patents are likely to be an
undersupplied public good, and (6) enhanced damages and
injunctions have a chilling effect on patent challenges.
1. The Limited Relevance of the Probability of Success
The probability of successfully challenging the patent holder
in court is only a significant determinant of whether an alleged
infringer will challenge in a limited range of cases. To begin with,
if the cost of licensing is lower than the minimum threshold of
litigation, it never makes sense to challenge. Furthermore, if the
patent holder’s royalty demands are high enough, it makes sense
to challenge their patent in court almost regardless of the
probability of success (depending on the salience of penalties for
challenging unsuccessfully, discussed below).
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2. High Litigation Costs Insulate Bad Patents from Challenge
Bad patents can remain unchallenged as long as the royalties
demanded are less than the minimum threshold of litigation
costs. Patent holders are in the driver’s seat in this regard
because they get to determine what license fees they will demand,
and they do so in full knowledge of the litigation costs faced by
alleged infringers. Strategic patent holders can also effect the
alleged infringer’s decision to challenge by raising the costs of
challenging by seeking a temporary injunction and/or
establishing a reputation for demanding extravagant license fees
at the conclusion of fully litigated cases. 102
The costs of litigation cannot be measured purely in terms of
lawyer’s fees. In most cases, serious patent litigation distracts key
personnel from their core responsibilities. For example, Research
In Motion, the Canadian company at the center of the recent
Blackberry litigation was described as “critically distracted” by
the protracted litigation. 103 Patent litigation can also have a
negative effect on relations with outside investors, either in terms
of the stock price for publicly traded companies or the availability
of venture capital financing for smaller companies. The mere
public announcement of a patent law suit can depress the
defendant’s stock price on average two to three percent, 104 and
sometimes much more. 105 In addition, the lingering cloud of
patent litigation can be especially harmful to small firms,
particularly those firms with limited product diversity. 106 The
102. The Supreme Court’s decision in eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C. may
allow district courts to take this into account when assessing the equities of
granting an injunction to patent holders. 126 S. Ct. 1837, 1839 (2006) (holding
that well-established principles of equity require a plaintiff seeking permanent
injunction under the Patent Act to satisfy a four-factor test before a court may
grant such relief).
103. Troy Wolverton, RIM's Up, Still on the Ropes, THESTREET.COM, June 29,
2006,
http://www.thestreet.com/_googlen/tech/gamesandgadgets/10294275.html?cm_ve
n=GOOGLEN&cm_cat=FREE&cm_ite=NA.
104. Sanjai Bhagat et al., The Costs of Inefficient Bargaining and Financial
Distress: Evidence from Corporate Lawsuits, 35 J. FIN. ECON. 221, 223, 230-31,
239 (1994); see also Josh Lerner, Patenting in the Shadow of Competitors, 38 J.L.
& ECON. 463, 471 (1995).
105. See, e.g., James Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, Lessons for Patent Policy
from Empirical Research on Patent Litigation, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1, 10
(2005) (noting that in the pharmaceutical industry losses have gone as high as
30% when news of unfavorable rulings emerged).
106. See Jean O. Lanjouw & Josh Lerner, Tilting the Table? The Predatory
Use of Preliminary Injunctions, 44 J.L. & ECON. 573, 575-76 (2001).
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extraordinary length of time it takes to invalidate a patent
through litigation – 8.6 years on average – exacerbates this
problem considerably. 107
It is difficult to precisely measure the total costs of patent
litigation, but according to one rough estimate, the total direct
cost of patent litigation in the United States every year exceeds
$2 billion. 108 This figure excludes money actually paid by way of
settlement or final judgment. 109 As noted above, the American
Intellectual Property Law Association Economic Survey places
the average cost of patent litigation at around $650,000 for a low
valued patent and up to $4.5 million for a higher value patent. 110
As long as the minimum threshold of litigation costs remains
high, bad patent holders will be able to avoid challenge by simply
pitching the license demands below the cost of litigation. Any
patent reform that reduced the minimum threshold of litigation
costs would greatly decrease the ability of patent holders to do
this. 111
3. The Uncertainties of Patent Litigation Insulate Bad Patents
from Challenge
The CF-model addresses the potential infringer’s probability
of successfully challenging a patent as opposed to the validity of
the asserted patent per se. A number of factors combine to
produce the result that the alleged infringer’s probability of
winning and the probability that the patent is valid are not the
same thing. The alleged infringer’s probability of successfully
challenging the patent is not directly linked to validity because of
the uncertain nature of patent litigation and the considerable
risks of judicial error. As a normative matter, most patent
challengers are confident that they should win; however the
nature of patent litigation is such that very few can ever be sure
as a predictive matter that they will successfully challenge a
particular patent. All litigation is uncertain to some extent, but
anecdotal reports from judges and patent lawyers indicate that
107. Lemley, supra note 22, at 1520. (finding that the average time from
patent issuance to a final litigated decision on validity is 8.6 years).
108. Id. at 1502.
109. Id.
110. AIPLA ECON. SURVEY, supra note 41, at 22. (For a patent valued at less
than $1M over its life, the cost of discovery alone approaches $350,000. For
patents valued between $1M and $25M, the average costs rise to $1.25M for
discovery and $2M for complete litigation. For those patents which exceed $25M
in value, costs average $3M for discovery and $4.5M for litigation).
111. The effectiveness of post-grant review in this regard is discussed infra
notes 253-57 and accompanying text.
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patent litigation is a particularly uncertain form of legal action. 112
The Uncertainty of Claim Construction
Although there are many causes of uncertainty in patent
litigation, the claim construction process is arguably the most
significant. Claim construction is the critical stage of patent
litigation where the court decides what the words describing the
patent holder’s rights actually mean. Every patent includes “one
or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming
the subject matter which the applicant regards as her
invention.” 113 These claims define the boundaries of the patent
holder’s rights with respect to the invention. Because language is
ambiguous and the path of technology is unpredictable, however,
there will often be disagreements between plaintiffs and
defendants as to the precise meaning of the patent claims. In the
context of a patent claim, even seemingly straightforward words
such as “a,” “or,” “to,” and “when” become the subject of contested
argument. In the recent Federal Circuit decision in Phillips v.
AWH, the court wrestled with the question of whether the term
“baffles” should be given its ordinary meaning as a “means for
obstructing, impeding, or checking the flow of something” or
whether it should be read restrictively based on the patent’s
written description to exclude structures that extend at a ninetydegree angle from the walls. 114 To an outside observer this is
indeed baffling.
Before 1996, claim construction was regarded as a mixed
question of fact and law. However, in Markman v. Westview
Instruments, the Supreme Court determined that claim
By making claim
construction was a question of law. 115
construction a question of law, the effect of Markman has been to
significantly increase the Federal Circuit’s discretion in reviewing
claim construction.
Unfortunately, the Federal Circuit has not settled on a
consistent methodology for claim construction, leading to
112. See, e.g., Douglas J. Kline, Patent Litigation: The Sport of Kings, TECH.
REV., Apr. 28, 2004, at http://www.technologyreview.com/ BizTech/13562/
(describing patent litigation as complex, uncertain, and expensive).
113. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000).
114. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1310 (Fed. Cir. 2005). The
patented invention pertained to modular, steel-shell panels that could be welded
together to form vandalism-resistant walls. See U.S. Patent No. 4,677,798.
115. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 391 (1996), aff’g
52 F.3d 967 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc).
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significant doctrinal instability and confusion in the lower
courts. 116 Indeed, Federal Circuit reversal of Markman decisions
has become so routine that many judges and attorneys wonder
why they bother with claim construction hearings at all. At least
one district court judge has expressed the view that “the only
thing that really is predictable in this area of the law is that we
district judges will likely get it wrong, or at least that the Federal
Circuit will say that we got it wrong.” 117 Confirming this
pessimism, Christian Chu finds that for cases involving claim
construction filed between January 1, 1998, and April 30, 2000,
the Federal Circuit modified the district court judge’s claim
interpretation in 44% of cases and reversed it in 30% of cases. 118
Ostensibly, a Markman hearing should give parties a firm
understanding of what subject matter is covered by the patent at
issue. Unfortunately, the significant chance that any claim
interpretation made by a district court judge will be overturned or
revised on appeal dilutes the effectiveness of the Markman
process. In reality the scope of the patent is unclear at every
stage, from issuance through litigation and appeal. In essence,
parties must proceed through the decision making and litigation
process with often erroneous claim and scope interpretations. 119
The claim construction process is also rendered uncertain for
potential infringers by the doctrine of equivalents. Under the
doctrine of equivalents, a court will extend the scope of the patent
holder’s rights beyond the literal language of the patent claim to
cover an infringing product or process that is unsubstantially
different 120 or “performs substantially the same function in

116. See, e.g., R. Polk Wagner & Lee Petherbridge, Is the Federal Circuit
Succeeding? An Empirical Assessment of Judicial Performance, 152 U. PA. L.
REV. 1105 (2004).
117. Honorable Kathleen M. O'Malley et al., Panel Discussion: Claim
Construction from the Perspective of the District Judge, 54 CASE W. RES. L. Rev.
671, 672 (2004).
118. Christian A. Chu, Empirical Analysis of the Federal Circuit's Claim
Construction Trends, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1075, 1104 (2001); see also Cybor
Corp. v. FAS Techs., 138 F.3d 1448, 1476 n.16 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en banc) (Rader,
J., dissenting) (noting that 37.3% of all claim constructions reversed in whole or
in part since Markman I); Kimberly A. Moore, Are District Court Judges
Equipped to Resolve Patent Cases?, 15 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 2-3 (2001) (“District
court judges improperly construe patent claim terms in 33% of the cases appealed
to the Federal Circuit.”).
119. See Moore, supra note 118, at 2-3. (“In the absence of a route for
expedited appeal of claim construction, district courts are forced to proceed with
lengthy and expensive patent litigation based on their frequently erroneous claim
construction.”).
120. Sage Prods. v. Devon Indus., 126 F.3d 1420, 1423 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
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substantially the same way to obtain the same result.” 121 The
doctrine of equivalents is intended to protect the patent holder
from “unscrupulous copyists” who would otherwise evade a patent
holder’s rights by making minimal modifications to the patented
product or process. 122 However, in reality the doctrine of
equivalents probably does more to protect patent holders from the
incompetence of their attorneys than anything else. The Supreme
Court argues that the inherent ambiguity of language and the
unpredictable path of technological innovation require some
flexibility be extended to patent holders in the form of the
doctrine of equivalents. 123 However, as the Supreme Court
acknowledged, the doctrine of equivalents itself exacerbates the
ambiguity of claim language. 124 As Josh Sarnoff explains, the
modern doctrine of equivalents extends a patent’s scope beyond
questions of identity of “whether the product or process is an
embodiment of the claimed category” to the open-ended question
of similarity. 125
The doctrine of prosecution history estoppel neutralizes the
expansive effect of the doctrine of equivalents with respect to
claims that have been narrowed during the course of patent
prosecution. 126 Under this doctrine, a patentee who narrows her
claims at an earlier stage of litigation is estopped from later
arguing that the subject matter covered by the original, broader
claim that was nothing more than an equivalent. 127 However,
prosecution history estoppel itself is limited and uncertain.
Consequently, although prosecution history estoppel might in

121. Graver Tank & Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 608
(1950) (quoting Sanitary Refrigerator Co. v. Winters, 280 U.S. 30, 42 (1929)).
122. Id. at 607.
123. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722,
731-732 (2002).
124. Festo, 535 U.S. at 732. (“the doctrine of equivalents renders the scope of
patents less certain.”); see also Joshua D. Sarnoff, Abolishing the Doctrine of
Equivalents and Claiming the Future After Festo, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J 1157
(2004) (arguing for the abolition of the doctrine of equivalents).
125. Id.
126. Festo, 535 U.S. at 727 (noting that when the patentee responds to the
rejection by narrowing her claims, this prosecution history estops him from later
arguing that the subject matter covered by the original, broader claim was
nothing more than an equivalent).
127. See id. at 733-34 (“When, however, the patentee originally claimed the
subject matter alleged to infringe but then narrowed the claim in response to a
rejection, he may not argue that the surrendered territory comprised unforeseen
subject matter that should be deemed equivalent to the literal claims of the
issued patent.”).
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some senses be described as an antidote to the expansive effect of
the doctrine of equivalents, it is by no means an antidote to the
uncertainty and confusion that equivalents add to the already
uncertain arena of claim interpretation.
The Presumption of Validity
A second significant cause of uncertainty in patent litigation
is the Federal Circuit’s interpretation of the presumption of
validity. According to the Federal Circuit, a defendant seeking to
invalidate a patent must do more than cast significant doubt on
the patent’s validity; she must prove by “clear and convincing
evidence” that the patent is invalid. 128 Although the current
Patent Act clearly establishes that an issued patent carries a
presumption of validity, 129 it is only by virtue of case law that this
presumption has been elevated to the high standard of clear and
convincing evidence. This heightened standard of proof might
make sense if patents were subject to a more rigorous system of
examination, but given the very limited nature of patent
examination at the Patent Office, it is particularly hard to defend
as a matter of principle. 130
The clear and convincing evidence standard increases a
potential challenger’s uncertainty because, although in theory a
defendant could simply factor the heightened standard into her
risk calculations, the practicality of doing so is another matter
entirely. Even if the alleged infringer possesses what she believes
to be “killer” prior art – for example, something that shows that
the supposed invention had already been described in a printed
publication well before the patent owner’s claimed invention date
– she must still ask herself whether this evidence will meet the
gold standard of clear and convincing evidence. It is entirely
possible that a reasonably competent patent examiner would find
that the prior art anticipated the invention, but that a jury faced

128. See, e.g., Kegel Co. v. AMF Bowling, Inc., 127 F.3d 1420, 1429 (Fed. Cir.
1997) (invalidity must be established by facts supported by clear and convincing
evidence).
129. 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2000) (providing in relevant part that, “[a] patent shall
be presumed valid. Each claim of a patent . . . shall be presumed valid
independently of the validity of other claims . . . . The burden of establishing
invalidity of a patent or any claim thereof shall rest on the party asserting such
invalidity.”); see also New England Braiding Co. v. A.W. Chesterton Co., 970
F.2d 878, 882 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (“The presumption acts as a procedural device
which places the burden of going forward with evidence and the ultimate burden
of persuasion of invalidity at trial on the alleged infringer.”).
130. See supra, Part II-A.
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with the same evidence would be unconvinced. 131 Given that
juries in patent cases are comprised of lay people who are
unfamiliar with both the relevant law and the relevant
technology, it is hard to know confidently ex ante whether the
most convincing evidence in the world will actually prove to be
clear and convincing in a court room setting. This intuition is
borne out in studies of jury decisions in patent cases, which
indicate that patent owners are significantly more likely to win at
jury trials than otherwise. 132
As the MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc. case illustrates,
once a bad patent issues it is much easier to convince the Patent
Office of its error than it is to defend an allegation of
infringement at a jury trial. 133 Although eBay lost on the merits
in federal court, 134 it was far more successful in inter partes
reexamination in the Patent Office. In January 2005, the Patent
Office issued an initial ruling rejecting all of the claims contained
in MercExchange’s online auctions patent. 135 In March 2005, the
Patent Office issued an initial ruling rejecting all of the claims
contained in the MercExchange electronic consignment systems
patent. 136 Then in May 2005, the Patent Office issued an initial
ruling rejecting all of the claims contained in the MercExchange
multiple database searching. 137 These were all patents that eBay
had already been found to have infringed in its jury trial in the
Eastern District of Virginia. 138
The Effect of Uncertainty
The uncertainty of patent litigation is significant because it
reduces the alleged infringer’s expectation of successfully
challenging a bad patent. Put simply, the alleged infringer may
131. See infra notes 134–38 and accompanying text.
132. See Kimberly A. Moore, Judges, Juries and Patent Cases: An Empirical
Peek Inside the Black Box, 99 MICH. L. REV. 365, 368 (2000) (concluding that
juries are significantly pro-patentee in suits for infringement).
133. See eBay Inc. Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 30 (Feb. 24, 2006).
134. MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc., 275 F. Supp. 2d 695 (E.D. Va. 2003),
aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 401 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
135. See eBay Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 30 (Feb. 24, 2006).
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Note that the Federal Circuit also invalidated all claims asserted against
eBay and its subsidiaries arising out of the multiple database search patent, but
reversed the district court’s order granting summary judgment in eBay’s favor
regarding the auction patent. MercExchange, LLC v. eBay, Inc., 401 F.3d 1323,
1330 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
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have a well founded objective belief that a patent is invalid, but
she can never be very sure of what the patent claims will be taken
to mean or how much evidence will be required to overcome the
clear and convincing evidence standard. This uncertainty clearly
disadvantages risk averse parties and it also makes threats by
patent holders to pursue litigation more credible because almost
no assertion of rights by a patent holder is too far-fetched.
4. Information Asymmetries Insulate Bad Patents from Challenge
Information asymmetries insulate bad patents from
challenge by deterring alleged infringers from challenging bad
patents through the extra informational costs the assymetries
impose. An essential problem with bad patents is differentiating
them from good patents. When an alleged infringer receives a
threat letter, she may have very little information upon which to
assess its merits. In contrast, the patent owner generally has
much greater knowledge of the validity and scope of her patent.
She knows things such as the amount of effort that was made to
research the prior art before the patent was filed, her success in
extracting license fees from other targets, and the strength of the
patent in light of the known prior art. She is also familiar with
the patent’s prosecution history – including any narrowed claims.
These information asymmetries are such that, at least at the
early stages, a weak lawsuit may be difficult to distinguish from a
strong lawsuit. An alleged infringer can do a number of things to
investigate the quality of a patent that is threatened against her:
she can hire lawyers to research the patent, she can hire
engineers to research the technology, and/or she can gather
information on her own through public and private sources. All of
these activities may change her evaluation of how likely she is to
successfully challenge the patent holder, but only by increasing
the alleged infringer’s information costs. Furthermore, some
information asymmetries can only be overcome through
discovery, which means spending several hundred thousand
dollars on litigation.
5. Challenges to Bad Patents are Likely to be an Undersupplied
Public Good
As several commentators have observed, the Supreme Court’s
Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Illinois
Foundation decision creates an ironic public good problem for any
individual who seeks to challenge the validity of a patent. 139
139. 402 U.S. 313, 350 (1971) (holding that a finding of patent invalidity
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Although an alleged infringer must bear the whole burden of
pursuing her claim of invalidity, if she wins she must share the
benefits of her labor with the whole world, including all her
competitors. 140 This suggests that unless alleged infringers can
find some method of coordinating, they will not supply the
optimum level of resistance to the demands of patent owners. 141
A related problem is that in some markets, the alleged
infringer’s utility from successfully challenging a patent may be
overstated by the CF-model explored in this section. Some alleged
infringers will be able to simple pass royalty costs through to the
consumer, as long as their competitors are also subject to the
same costs. 142 Furthermore, some alleged infringers may use the
threat of patent litigation as an opportunity to raise their rivals’
costs by settling patent disputes early at a discount. 143 If two
parties are involved in patent litigation, and both realize that the
invalidation challenge will be successful, each party actually has
an incentive to settle the litigation through licensing. The patent
holder’s incentive is obvious due to Blonder-Tongue: if she settles
with the defendant, she maintains some chance of enforcing the
patent against future defendants. 144 Not quite so obvious is the
fact that the alleged infringer’s incentive to settle can be just as
compelling, even if her expectation of victory is high. 145 An
alleged infringer who settles cheaply cannot only avoid sharing
her victory with her competitors, she can actually impose a higher
cost on those competitors if the appearance of settlement

during litigation applies to all, not just to the benefit of the challenging party). A
public good is a good which is both non-rivalrous and non-excludable. Nonrivalrous goods can be consumed by one person without reducing the
consumption of others. Non-excludable goods cannot be effectively fenced off so as
to prevent others from enjoying them. Lighthouses, sunsets and national defense
are common examples of public goods. See Paul A. Samuelson, The Pure Theory of
Public Expenditure, 36 REV. ECON. & STAT. 387, 387 (1954); see also Matthew
Sag, Beyond Abstraction: The Law and Economics of Copyright Scope and
Doctrinal Efficiency, 81 TUL. L. REV. 187, 193 (2006).
140. Miller, supra note 22, at; John R. Thomas, Collusion and Collective
Action in the Patent System: A Proposal for Patent Bounties, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV.
305, 333. Note that non-infringement is not necessarily a public good because it
may only be the unique activities of an individual that are in fact non-infringing.
141. Miller, supra note 22, at 668-673 (“forced sharing undermines an alleged
infringer’s reason for fighting the patent case to the finish— especially if the
patent owner offers an attractive settlement.”).
142. Farrell & Merges, supra note 22, at 943.
143. See id. at 954–55.
144. See id. at 968.
145. See id. at 955-56.
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increases their perception of the validity of the patent. 146
In their article examining incentives to challenge and defend
patents, Farrell and Merges point to the case of Gilbert Hyatt’s
negotiations with North American Philips Corporation as an
example of how settlement may be leveraged in infringement
proceedings. 147 Gilbert Hyatt was a non-manufacturing patent
holder who sought royalties from manufacturers in the LCD
industry. Many of the targeted competitors considered litigation,
but Phillips Corporation chose to settle the dispute early, in
return for beneficial terms. 148 As part of the settlement, Phillips
agreed to help Hyatt extract royalties from other competitors in
the field. 149
Joseph Miller highlights a different example 150 of the
incentive-to-settle using the Amazon.com “one-click” patent case
The district court found
against Barnesandnoble.com. 151
Amazon.com’s “one-click” patent valid and issued an injunction
against Barnesandnoble.com’s use of that feature on its website.
However, the Federal Circuit later vacated the preliminary
injunction and concluded that Barnesandnoble.com had “mounted
a substantial challenge to the validity of the patent.” 152 While
not formally deciding the invalidity of the patent, the Federal
Circuit remanded the decision back to the district court with what
amounted to a step-by-step explanation of how and why the
district court was to invalidate the patent. 153 Instead of pursuing
the almost certain invalidation of Amazon.com’s patent in the
district court, Barnesandnoble.com settled the case, leaving the
patent on the books as a credible threat against future
booksellers who may have sought to compete with Amazon.com or
Barnesandnoble.com. 154
The combined effect of the public good nature of challenging a
patent and the pass-through problem means that not only will
potential infringers have sub-optimal incentives to challenge a
146. Later licensees will typically pay greater licensing fees than those who
were early to the table.
147. Farrell & Merges, supra note 22, at 970 n. 32.
148. Philips Licenses Hyatt’s Microcomputer Patents, PATENT WORLD, Dec.
1991 / Jan. 1992, at 15.
149. Id.
150. Miller, supra note 22.
151. Amazon.com v. Barnesandnoble.com, Inc., 73 F. Supp. 2d 1228 (W.D.
Wash. 1999), vacated, 239 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
152. Amazon.com v. Barnesandnoble.com, Inc., 239 F.3d 1343, 1347 (Fed. Cir.
2001).
153. Miller, supra note 22, at 671-72.
154. Id. at 672.
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patent in the first place, but that even when they do it will almost
certainly be in their interests to accept a settlement at some stage
before a final judgment is entered. Consequently, even if bad
patents are initially challenged, we should not be confident that
potential infringers will pursue those challenges to completion.
6. The Chilling Effect of Enhanced Damages and Injunctions
The CF-model set forth in the previous section 155 shows that
the penalties associated with an unsuccessful challenge become
increasingly significant as the probability of successfully
challenging the patent falls. Since its formation, the Federal
Circuit has tended to exacerbate these penalties through its
increased willingness to order preliminary and final
award
enhanced
damages
for
willful
injunctions, 156
infringement, 157 and its greater flexibility in calculating patent
damages in general. 158
The possibility of a preliminary injunction can have a
substantial chilling effect on a potential infringer’s willingness to
pursue litigation. The effect of a preliminary injunction has been
described as “the financial equivalent of nuclear winter” because
of the economic hardship and disruption it imposes on
defendants. 159 Furthermore, settlements and royalties negotiated
in the shadow of an injunction are likely to be distorted where the
patent relates only to a small component of some larger product
(or service) but has the ability to hold-up the entirety. 160
Despite the Federal Circuit’s recognition that a preliminary
injunction is “a drastic and extraordinary remedy that is not to be
routinely granted,” 161 the court now routinely issues preliminary
injunctions 162 in patent infringement cases. 163 In a 1983 case,
155. See supra Part II. B.2.
156. See Lanjouw & Lerner, supra note 106, at 575–76.
157. See Underwater Devices Inc. v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 717 F.2d 1380,
1389 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (imposing an affirmative duty on potential infringer with
actual notice of patent holder’s rights to exercise due care to determine whether
or not she is infringing those rights).
158. See Roger D. Blair & Thomas F. Cotter, Rethinking Patent Damages, 10
TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 1, 2 (2001).
159. Michelle Armond, Introducing the Defense of Independent Invention to
Motions for Preliminary Injunctions in Patent Infringement Lawsuits, 91 CAL. L.
REV. 117, 120 (2003) (citing Brenda Sandburg, Trolling for Dollars, SAN
FRANCISCO RECORDER, July 30, 2001, at 1).
160. See Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 38.
161. Intel Corp. v. ULSI Sys. Tech., 995 F.2d 1566, 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
162. The court’s authority with respect to preliminary injunctions is found in
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Smith International, Inc. v. Hughes Tool Co., the Federal Circuit
held that an immediate irreparable harm to the patent holder
should be presumed whenever the validity and continuing
infringement of the patent had been established. 164 Since then,
the court has further stated that “[t]he presumption of
irreparable harm [now] acts as a procedural device which places
the ultimate burden of production on the question of irreparable
harm onto the alleged infringer.” 165 This stance is inconsistent
with the Supreme Court’s decision in eBay, 166 and will likely be
reversed in the near future.
The distorting effect of the threat of treble damages and
attorney’s fees for willful infringement is widely recognized.
According to Federal Circuit case law, the application of treble
damages and attorney’s fees is appropriate where an infringer
had “actual notice of [the plaintiff’s] patent rights” and failed “to
exercise due care to determine whether or not [she was]
infringing” upon those rights. 167 However, the Federal Circuit’s
broad interpretation of “actual notice” makes this a significant
risk. 168
D. DIFFERENTIAL IMPACT AND THE CHALLENGER FOCUSED MODEL
The CF-model illustrates that it is easy for bad patents to go
unchallenged because of certain structural features of modern
patent litigation. High litigation costs, uncertainty in litigation,
information asymmetries, the public good problem, and the
enhanced penalties of losing a court challenge all deter alleged
infringers from mounting a challenge to the validity of the patent
holder’s rights. The cumulative effect of these factors is that the
overall incentive for any given potential infringer to challenge a
patent is often very weak, even if the probability that the patent
is invalid is very high.
The CF-model predicts that an alleged infringer will
challenge the patent holder if the cost of litigation is less than or

35 U.S.C. § 283 (2005) (“[C]ourts having jurisdiction of cases under this title may
grant injunctions in accordance with the principles of equity to prevent the
violation of any right secured by patent . . . .”).
163. Lanjouw & Lerner, supra note 106, at 575-76.
164. 718 F.2d 1573, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
165. Reebok Int’l Ltd. v. J. Baker, Inc., 32 F.3d 1552, 1556 (Fed. Cir. 1994)
(citing Roper Corp. v. Litton Sys., Inc., 757 F.2d 1266, 1272 (Fed. Cir. 1985)).
166. See eBay Inc., 126 S. Ct. 1837.
167. Underwater Devices Inc., 717 F.2d 1380, 1389 (Fed. Cir. 1983). Enhanced
damages are provided for in 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2000).
168. See infra Part III.B.2.
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equal to the probability of winning multiplied by the cost of the
license plus the probability of losing multiplied by the penalties
associated with an unsuccessful challenge to the patent such as
increased royalty rates and enhanced damages for willful
infringement. Or, in terms of the notation,
Challenge if: L < αCL + (1-α) (CP + P)

(Equation 1)

All other things being equal, the higher litigation costs rise,
the less likely an alleged infringer will be to challenge. As noted
above, when probability of success is very high, the most
important factor determining whether an alleged infringer will
challenge is the ratio of litigation costs to licensing costs. If patent
holders can keep their royalty demands at less than the cost of
litigation, alleged infringers are unlikely to challenge, no matter
how confident they are of winning. If the minimum threshold for
litigation is several hundred thousand dollars, keeping patent
royalty demands below this amount is easy for the patent holder
to do. If the minimum threshold for litigation was considerably
less, as it would be under the system of post-grant review set
forth in Part IV, it would be very difficult for the holders of bad
patents to rely on licensee capitulation. 169
As discussed in the previous section, the CF-model shows
that the alleged infringer’s prospects of success are often not
significant in deciding whether to challenge a patent.
Furthermore, even where the prospects of success are a
significant factor in the alleged infringer’s decision making
process, they are only indirectly related to the validity of the
underlying patent because of the uncertainties of patent litigation
and information asymmetries. This is an important insight of the
CF-model, but it is also important to understand that the lack of
relevance of the validity of the underlying patent applies equally
to good patents as to bad patents. Much of the reform literature
advocates reducing the structural disincentives to challenge bad
patents without acknowledging the role these features play in
protecting good patents. The same factors that insulate bad
patents from challenge are also a significant component of the
value of all patents – whether they are good or bad.
We cannot be assured that all reforms that make patents
easier to challenge will in fact have a differential impact on bad

169. See infra Part IV.
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patents because, under the current system, the holders of good
patents have almost as much to fear from a challenge to the
validity of their patents as bad patent holders. This may seem
counter-intuitive, but recall that the label “bad patent” is not
synonymous with invalid patent. 170 Bad patents are those which
are asserted to cover products or activities that no reasonable fact
finder could find they did in fact cover – either because the patent
was obviously invalid, or because the patent claims were
obviously too narrow to support such an assertion.
Figure 1, below, represents four patents on a sliding scale of
patent validity. The closer a patent is to the left hand side of the
scale the more likely it is to be upheld by a court. Consider the
following four patents; Patent A has a 95% chance of being found
to be valid, Patent B has 60% chance, Patent C has a 50% chance
and Patent D has a 5% chance. 171 As illustrated in Figure 1,
Patent D is clearly a bad patent. In contrast, although Patents B
and C may ultimately be found invalid if subject to litigation, they
are not bad patents. 172 Many good patents will turn out to be
invalid (or not infringed) once put to the test of litigation because
of the vagaries of claim construction and other shifts in patent
doctrine. Furthermore, a certain percentage of valid good patents
are likely to be incorrectly invalidated (or found not infringed)
due to judicial error. Reforms that uniformly lower the cost of
litigation or make patents easier to challenge will not only place
greater pressure on Patent D; they will also significantly affect
the value of Patent B and Patent C which are not bad patents.
FIGURE 1: SLIDING SCALE OF PATENT VALIDITY

Valid

Invalid
A

BC

D

170. See supra Part I.B-1.
171. Figure 1 is constructed in terms of patent validity, however, it could also
be redrawn in terms of the likelihood that a particular patent claim covered the
alleged infringer’s business: i.e. while the infringer has a 95% chance of being
found to infringe Patent A, it only has a 5% chance of being found liable for
infringing Patent D.
172. Again, the analysis is the same for hyper-assertion.
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The strong form of the differential impact test requires that
any change to the patent system will devalue Patent D, but will
not significantly effect the value of Patents A, B and C as
represented in Figure 1. Differential impact favors reforms that
will expose patents that are very likely to be invalid (or hyperasserted) to greater scrutiny, but recognizes that even the holders
of good patents have a lot to lose from patent litigation. The CFmodel is very useful for explaining why bad patents survive, but
in order to identify reform proposals that will reduce the value of
bad patents without affecting the value of good patents, we need a
model that focuses on the patent holder’s incentive to assert bad
patents rather than the alleged infringer’s incentive to challenge
them. In the next section we present an assertion focused model
(“AF-model”) which does just that.
E. AN ASSERTION FOCUSED MODEL
In this section we present a new model for analyzing patent
reform proposals. Instead of focusing on the potential infringer’s
incentive to challenge a patent, this new model focuses on the
patent holder’s incentive to assert her patent, including the
relationship of the incentive to assert to the quality of the
underlying patent. We begin with the proposition that a rational
patent holder will assert her rights so long as the expected value
of assertion is greater than the expected cost.
Variable Definitions:
γ

=

Probability of target accepting a license. 173

π

=

Profit to patent holder from licensing the
patent.

T

=

Cost to patent holder to locate and engage
potential licensees (a.k.a. targets).

R

=

Cost to patent holder from retaliation by the
target.

δ

=

Probability of retaliation by target.

The patent holder’s utility in asserting her patent is a

173. γ is the reciprocal of α in the CF-model. See supra Part II.B.2.
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function of the cost of finding a target (T), the probability that the
target will accept a license (γ), the licensing revenue the patent
holder will derive if the target accepts the license (π), and the
expected cost of retaliation (δR). 174
Utility function:
The patent holder’s utility in asserting her patent can be
expressed in terms of the notation as follows:
UAssert: γ(π – T) – (1 – γ)( T + δR)
In other words, when a patent owner persuades a target to
accept a license, she gains licensing fees which must be off-set
against the cost of identifying and engaging with the target; when
a patent owner fails to persuade a target to accept a license, she
loses her investment in identifying and engaging with the target
and suffers the consequences of any retaliatory actions that her
assertion may provoke.
The possibility of retaliation is the cornerstone of this model.
Every assertion of right by the patent holder carries with it some
possibility that the target will retaliate. When a patent holder
sends an infringement notice to an alleged infringer, she hopes
that the target will agree to her demands without complaint.
However, with each new potential licensee the patent owner also
faces a risk that the target will not only try to evade paying
license fees, but that it will also attempt to reduce or entirely
eradicate the commercial value of the patent. The most obvious
form of retaliation a target can inflict is to bring an action for
declaratory judgment that the patent is both invalid and not
infringed. Another more subtle form of retaliation includes
publicly defying the patent, thus forcing the patent owner to
either sue or implicitly acknowledge it is unable to enforce its
claims.
The patent holder will assert if
UAssert > 0
γ(π - T) > (1 - γ)(T + δR)
Restated in terms of the expected cost of retaliation yields:

174. δ is the probability of retaliation by the target, and R is the cost of
retaliation, thus δR is the expected cost of retaliation.
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(Equation 2)

The most important implication of this model is that where
targeting costs are low and the prospect of retaliation is small,
this inequality will almost always be met. Accordingly, a rational
patent holder will broadly assert her patent in these
circumstances, even where the probability that any individual
target will accept a license is low. In many cases patent holders
have an incentive to broadly assert patent rights regardless of the
low quality of the patent or the low probability that any one
potential infringer will accept a license. Indeed, as the AF-model
predicts, technology industry leaders frequently complain that
they are deluged with meritless patent assertions. 175
F. IMPLICATIONS OF THE ASSERTION FOCUSED MODEL FOR PATENT
REFORM
To reiterate, the AF-model provides some interesting insights
for patent reform. The model predicts that where targeting costs
are low and the expected cost of retaliation is small, a rational
patent holder will broadly assert her patent, even where the
probability that a target will accept a license is low. The model
also indicates that a patent holder’s incentive to assert her patent
increases as the target’s probability of accepting a license
increases. Accordingly, patent reform can have a differential
impact on bad patents in any one of three ways: (1) increasing the
targeting costs of bad patent holders without increasing the
targeting costs of good patent holders, (2) reducing the probability
that alleged infringers targeted by bad patent holders will accept
a license without reducing the probability that alleged infringers
targeted by good patent holders will accept a license, or (3)
increasing the expected cost of retaliation for asserting a bad
patent without increasing the expected cost of retaliation for
asserting a good patent. This final possibility – engineering
expected cost of retaliation for asserting a bad patent – appears to
be the most promising option for the reasons that follow.
First, while creating a differential impact with respect to

175. See, e.g., Edited and Excerpted Transcript of the Symposium on Ideas
into Action: Implementing Reform of the Patent System, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
1053, 1153 (2003). One general counsel lamented “if I had a dollar for every
letter that either we never heard from again or never responded when we wrote
to them, we would be rich.” Id. at 1153
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targeting costs is theoretically possible, none of the reforms
surveyed in this article (nor any others we are aware of) would
seem likely to have this effect.
Second, the potential to create a differential impact in terms
of the probability that alleged infringers targeted by bad patent
holders will accept a license is limited because the patent holder
often has a significant degree of control with respect to that
variable. Patent holders who can choose the identity of their
targets have a substantial degree of control over the probability of
retaliation. A target’s propensity to accept a license will depend in
part on the cost of the license; the more the patent holder
demands from the target, the more likely it is that the target will
refuse to pay. 176 A potential infringer’s propensity to accept a
license will also depend on how effectively it has been targeted;
the more accurately the patent holder identifies her potential
targets and the more effort she expends to make her threats of
litigation credible, the more likely it is that a target will opt to
license. For extractive patent holders, both of these are factors
within the patent holder’s control. So, in terms of the notation, γ =
f(π,T). Furthermore, sophisticated patent holders will seek out
those targets with the lowest probability of retaliation and/or the
lowest ability to inflict significant retaliatory costs and send them
an “offer to negotiate a license” letter. Once a few licensees have
signed up, the patent holder can expect γ (the probability that the
target will accept a license) to rise and δ (the probability of
retaliation by the target) to fall among new targets as word gets
out that other licensees have signed up or the patent holder
develops a market reputation. This reputation can be as much for
litigiousness as for the quality of their patents.
Third, creating a differential impact in terms of the
probability that alleged infringers targeted by bad patent holders
will accept a license also has limited potential because of
uncertainty and information asymmetries. In an ideal world a
target’s willingness to accept a license would depend on the
nature of the patent assertion – they would reject bad patent
assertions and seek to invalidate them through litigation.
However, as the CF-model indicates, uncertainty and information
asymmetries discourage alleged infringers from challenging
patents. In fact, because uncertainty and information
asymmetries have a leveling out effect, they increase the target’s
willingness to accept a license from bad patent holders and
176. This is subject to the obvious caveat that the holders of bad patents must
not seek license fees so low that they tip off the target that the patentee’s claims
are unsupportable.
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reduce their willingness to accept a license from good patent
holders. 177
In the face of substantial information asymmetries, a
target is likely to over-estimate the validity of bad patents and
underestimate the validity of good patents. In other words, if all
patents look the same to an alleged infringer, its willingness to
accept a license will be unrelated to the underlying quality of the
patent. If the holder of a good patent knows the patent to be good,
it is in her best interests to communicate this information to the
target. Alternatively, if the holder of a bad patent knows her
assertions are lacking in foundation, it is in her best interests to
restrict any information about the quality or scope of the patent.
But the problem faced by good patent holders is that whatever
steps they take to communicate the quality of their patent to the
target will be imitated by bad patent holders. It is difficult to
conceive of reforms to the current system that reduce γ for bad
patent holders without similarly affecting good patent holders. 178
Finally, changing the patent system to have a differential
impact on the probability that alleged infringers targeted by bad
patent holders will accept a license is unrealistic; however,
reforming the system in a manner that allows the expected value
of retaliation faced by good patents to diverge from that of bad
patents is more feasible. The introduction of a system of postgrant review will expose all patent holders to an increased threat
of challenge – in terms of the model it will increase δ. But what is
significant is that, as long as the system is designed correctly, the
expected costs of retaliation will fall far more heavily on bad
patent holders than on good patent holders. In terms of the
model, RBad > RGood. 179
We expect post-grant review to impose higher costs on bad
patents because it allows patents to be reviewed for obvious
errors at an early stage. In our view, post-grant review will be
most effective if it operates as an alternative to litigation that
seeks to weed out the most clearly improvidently granted patents,
as opposed to seeking to identify every single improvidently
granted patent. If this high threshold of invalidity is adhered to
validly granted patents should not be at substantial risk. 180 We
177.
178.
179.
180.

See infra Part III.C.3.
Id.
Id.
See infra Part IV.B.
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also expect post-grant review to impose higher costs on bad
patents because good patents will actually be advantaged by postgrant review. Post-grant review will reduce uncertainty and
information asymmetries relating to patent quality because
patents that survive post-grant review are more likely to be taken
seriously in the market than ones that have never been tested. In
this way, post-grant review provides a signal of patent quality for
good patents that bad patent holders face great costs in imitating.
G. THE RELEVANCE OF ECONOMIC MODELS TO PATENT REFORM
In Part I of this article we argued that Congressional action
on patent reform should be targeted towards implementing the
reforms most likely to have a differential impact on bad patents.
Ideally, patents are issued to the creators of new, useful, and nonobvious inventions to give them an incentive to invest resources
in innovation where they would not do so otherwise. However, a
considerable number of patents are issued that do not meet the
standards of patentability and do not encourage investment in
innovation. In this Part, we sought to explain both the origin and
survival of bad patents. Specifically, we discussed why the Patent
Office issues invalid and uncertain patents and why some patent
holders see value in asserting patent rights that no reasonable
judge or jury would uphold.
The economic models discussed in this Part confirm
experiences that are often reported anecdotally by patent
practitioners. First, alleged infringers often have weak incentives
to challenge bad patents (even if they are fairly sure they are
invalid). Second, patent holders have strong incentives to overclaim their rights. Understanding these phenomena of the
modern patent system is central to determining which proposed
reforms are likely to have a differential impact on bad patents.
Commentators who rely solely on a variation of the CF-model
may have overlooked the fact that the same structural
impediments that shield bad patents from litigation also protect
good patents from litigation. Thus, in spite of the fact that most of
the reform literature sees lowering the cost of challenging patent
validity as an unqualified good, we are more neutral. Reforms
that make all patents easier to challenge will not necessarily have
a differential impact on bad patents.
Because the CF-model does not necessarily tell us which
reforms are likely to have a differential impact on bad patents, we
developed a second economic model focused on the patent holder’s
incentives to assert her patent rights. The AF-model indicates
that where targeting costs are low and the prospect of retaliation
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is small, a rational patent holder will broadly assert her patent
even where the probability that any individual target will accept
a license is low. The AF-model is particularly useful in
determining which proposed reforms are likely to have a
differential impact on bad patents. It indicates that exposing
patent holders to retaliation when they assert their patents has
the potential to create a differential cost between good patent
holders and bad patent holders. 181
Part III applies the insights generated by these economic
models to a wide range of patent-system reforms that are
currently under consideration.
PART III. APPLYING THE DIFFERENTIAL IMPACT TEST
Part I of this article explained the need for a clearer
understanding of bad patents and the need for a differential
impact test. The purpose of the differential impact test is to
suggest which reforms to the patent system Congress should
pursue as a matter of priority. As discussed, applying a test of
differential impact is necessary because of the empirical
uncertainty surrounding optimal patent scope and because of the
apparent need for a more targeted approach to patent reform
legislation. In Part II of this article we applied two economic
models to suggest what kinds of changes might have a differential
impact. In this Part we directly apply the differential impact test
to a broad survey of patent reform proposals, including those
embodied in the most recent House and Senate Bills. 182
Congress has recently been invited to consider a wide range
of solutions for the problems in the patent system. This subsection briefly reviews some of the major reforms under
consideration. Patent law reform proposals can be divided into
three main groups: examination reform, substantive doctrinal
changes, and proposals to reform the structure and procedures of
patent litigation. In the remainder of this section, these reform
proposals are evaluated against the differential impact test.
A. EXAMINATION REFORM
The first group of reform proposals relates to the Patent

181. Further research is required to determine whether this is the basis for a
true separating equilibrium.
182. These bills are no longer live, but their key proposals are likely to be put
before Congress in a revised form in the near future.
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Office’s process for examining and ultimately issuing patents.
One of the widely perceived problems with the patent system is
that too many suspect patents are issued. A simple solution
appears to be improving the quality of examination, thus
removing bad patents at the source.
Indeed, the Patent Office itself has taken up the cause of
examination reform. It proposes significant changes, such as
limiting an applicant’s right to file continuations, 183 streamlining
the examination process by requiring applicants to designate
representative claims for initial examination, 184 launching an
online peer review pilot project that seeks to ensure that patent
examiners will have improved access to all available prior art
during the patent examination process, 185 and changing the rules
relating to Information Disclosure Statements to encourage
patent applicants to give the Patent Office the most relevant
information related to their inventions in the early stages of the
review process. 186
The Patent Office has also recently proposed a new
“accelerated examination” procedure that would offer a final
decision on patentability within twelve months to applicants who
meet restrictive criteria. Under the proposed rules, accelerated
examination applicants must file electronically, conduct prior art
searches, submit all prior art that is closest to their invention,
identify all the limitations in the claims that are disclosed in the
submitted references (with accurate citations to the references),

183. Changes to Practice for Continuing Applications, Requests for Continued
Examination Practice, and Applications Containing Patentably Indistinct
Claims, Notice of proposed rulemaking, 71 Fed. Reg. 48, 48 (proposed Jan. 3,
2006)
(to
be
codified
at
37
C.F.R.
pt.1),
available
at
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/sol/notices/71fr48.pdf. If recently proposed
rule changes are adopted, applicants who wish to file any kind of continuation
application will have to support that filing with “a showing as to why the
amendment, argument, or evidence presented could not have been previously
submitted.” Id. The Patent Office hopes that the proposed change will “improve
the quality of issued patents, making them easier to evaluate, enforce, and
litigate” and give “the public a clearer understanding of what is patented.” Id.;
see also Mark A. Lemley & Kimberly A. Moore, Ending Abuse of Patent
Continuations, 84 B.U. L. REV. 63, 96-118 (2004) (discussing elimination or
limitation of continuation applications).
184. Changes to Practice for the Examination of Claims in Patent
Applications, 71 Fed. Reg. 61, 61 (proposed Jan. 3, 2006) (to be codified at 37
C.F.R.
pt.
1),
available
at
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/sol/notices/71fr61.pdf.
185. See Noveck, supra note 71.
186. See Changes to Information Disclosure Statement Requirements and
Other Related Matters, 71 Fed. Reg. 36323 (July 10, 2006), available at
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/sol/notices/71fr38808.pdf.
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explain the relationship of the prior art to the invention on a
claim by claim basis, and limit the patent to three independent
claims and no more than twenty claims in total. Accelerated
examination applicants must also agree to have an interview with
the patent examiner. 187
To the extent that a reform proposal merely calls for the
optimization of current resources, we consider it to be neutral in
terms of our differential impact analysis. 188 The harder question
is whether more resources should be allocated to patent
examination. The problem with simply throwing more money at
patent examination is that it is unclear how much additional
resources will reduce the problem of bad patents. As Mark Lemley
argues, while improving examination for the small fraction of
issued patents that are actually asserted would clearly be
worthwhile, improving examination for the other 95% would
largely be a waste of resources. 189
Spending more money on patent examination requires having
more money to spend in the first place. If we assume that we do
not want to divert the necessary funds away from health,
education or national security, finding more funds for patent
examination implies either increasing patent filing fees or simply
reviewing fewer patents and thus significantly increasing patent
pendency. In that event, raising the quality of examination may
do as much harm to the potential holders of good patents as it
would to holders of bad patents. Good and bad patentees are each
likely to be deterred from filing applications as the cost rises
and/or the pendency increases. 190 We take no position on whether
raising the quality of patent examination in general is justified,
but we do observe that it is hard to justify from the perspective of
the differential impact test. 191

187. Changes to Practice for Petitions in Patent Applications To Make Special
and for Accelerated Examination, 71 Fed. Reg. 36323, 36324 (June 26, 2006),
available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/sol/notices/71fr36323.pdf.
188. Reforms such as limiting the applicant’s right to file continuations,
requiring applicants to designate representative claims for initial examination,
online peer review and accelerated examination procedures are within the
Patent Office’s discretion to implement and do not require legislative action.
They are thus not the focus of this paper.
189. Lemley, supra note 22, at 1511.
190. It is possible that increasing the cost of obtaining a patent would have a
greater chilling effect on bad patents than good ones and thus have a weak
differential impact.
191. It is possible that increasing the cost of obtaining a patent may have a
weakly differential impact, if a higher quality of examination would give an
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In addition to changes initiated by the Patent Office, the
House and Senate Patent Reform Bills both propose three
significant changes to Patent Office procedure. First, both the
House and the Senate Bills propose changing the American “first
inventor” rule to the international standard of “first inventor to
file.” 192 Second, both Bills also provide for pre-grant opposition
allowing third parties to submit references to the examiner
If pre-grant
during prosecution of a patent application. 193
opposition is expanded as proposed, third parties who are
concerned that a piece of relevant prior art has been overlooked
by the applicant will no longer have to wait for the patent to
issue. They will be able to submit that prior art six months after
the patent is first published. Third, the House Bill provides for
the mandatory publication of patent applications. 194 Most patent
applications are already published after eighteen months under
the current regime; the significant change contemplated by the
House Bill is to make publication mandatory. 195
The differential impact analysis we have explored in this
article is generally supportive of the examination reforms
proposed under the House and Senate Bills. Adopting the
international practice of awarding the patent to the first inventor
to file an application is clearly a long overdue rationalization of
the current system. One advantage of a first-to- file system is that
it reduces uncertainty by prompting earlier disclosure of the
invention to the public. 196 A first-to- file system is also
advantageous because it would harmonize U.S. patent law with
that of most foreign countries. 197 Such harmonization would
consolidate the ownership of patent rights across national
boundaries and allow for more streamlined examination
internationally. Also, it should be recognized that there is no
significant downside to adopting a first-to-file system because the
advantage to good patents over bad patents.
192. Patent Reform Act of 2005, H.R. 2795, 109th Cong. § 3 (2005); Patent
Reform Act of 2006, S. 3818, 109th Cong. § 3 (2006).
193. Patents Depend on Quality Act of 2006, H.R. 5096, 109th Cong. § 4
(2006).
194. H.R. 5096 § 3.
195. Id.
196. But see Kieff, supra note 22, at 96. (arguing that the increased incentive
to file early in a first to file system may cause inventors to file premature and
ultimately invalid patent applications).
197. 151 CONG. REC. E1160 (daily ed. June 8, 2005) (statement of Rep.
Berman); see also Toshiko Takenaka, The Best Patent Practice or Mere
Compromise? A Review of the Current Draft of the Substantive Patent Law Treaty
and a Proposal for a “First-To-Invent” Exception for Domestic Applicants, 11 TEX.
INTELL. PROP. L.J. 259, 266–71 (2003).
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first to file is usually judged to be the first to invent as well. 198
Admittedly, adopting a first-to-file system is not likely to have a
differential impact on bad patents. But given that it reduces cost
and uncertainty for all patent holders at no cost to the public, we
endorse this particular reform.
The second examination reform proposed under the House
Bill is pre-grant opposition. 199 Allowing third parties to submit
references to the examiner during the prosecution of a patent
application should improve the quality of decision making for two
reasons. First, patent examiners will have access to information
that they may have otherwise overlooked. Second, the fact that a
third party has submitted prior art signals to the examiner that
the patent is potentially significant and that she should ensure a
thorough examination.
Allowing pre-grant opposition should have a differential
impact because third parties are likely to target patents that are
commercially relevant and may be easily invalidated by prior art.
Pre-grant opposition is likely to filter out some bad patents before
they are even issued. It should also ensure that the claims of
patents that are issued are more carefully scrutinized.
Nonetheless, the overall impact of pre-grant opposition may be
limited by its reliance the ability of third parties to monitor the
stream of patent applications as they are published. Furthermore,
such a system would have to be monitored by the Patent Office to
ensure that it was not abused to simply delay the issuance of
valid patents in particular industries.
The third examination reform proposed under the House Bill
is mandatory publication of all patent applications after eighteen
months. 200 Until relatively recently, patents filed in the United
States would remain secret until the day they were issued by the
Patent Office. This system was advantageous to patent applicants
because it allowed them to maintain trade secret rights in the
event that their application was ultimately unsuccessful. In 1999,
Congress passed the American Inventors Protection Act, which
required that a patent application be published eighteen months

198. Gerald J. Mossinghoff, The U.S. First-To-Invent System Has Provided No
Advantage To Small Entities, 84 J.PAT & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 425, 427 (2002)
(stating that between 1983 and 2000, the first to file won 1917 of the 2858
interference cases).
199. Patents Depend on Quality Act of 2006, H.R. 5096, 109th Cong. § 4
(2006).
200. H.R. 5096, § 3.
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after its earliest filing date. 201 However, the significance of that
reform was undermined by the broad exception for applicants
who did not file their patent application in any foreign publishing
country. Those applicants were allowed to opt out of automatic
publication. 202 The relevant provisions of the House Bill will
close this loophole and make publication after eighteen months
the rule for all patent applications. 203 Mandatory publication
would improve the patent system by reducing the possibility that
third parties are taken by surprise by an issued patent. 204 If a
company is aware that a patent that relates to on their business
may issue in the near future, it has the option of negotiating a
license with the applicant or to design around the patent. 205
Mandatory publication is likely to have a differential impact
on bad patents because secrecy is probably more helpful to bad
patent holders than to good ones. Patents made available to the
public during the examination process are more likely to be
subject to scrutiny than those that are not. Earlier exposure and
pre-grant opposition will enable interested third parties to
supplement the examination of the Patent Office, which should
lead to fewer potentially bad patents being issued.
B. DOCTRINAL REFORM
The FTC, the NAS and large sections of the academic
community have suggested numerous doctrinal reforms for patent
law. Some significant proposals include: raising the threshold of
narrowing
the
scope
of
willful
non-obviousness, 206
infringement, 207 lowering the burden of proof on patent alleged

201. American Inventors Protection Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106–113, § 4502,
113 Stat. 1501, 1501 (1999) (amending 35 U.S.C. § 122(b)).
202. 35 U.S.C. § 122(b)(2)(B) (2000).
203. H.R. 5096 § 3.
204. But see Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 38 (finding that, in some cases
where an upstream component is patented, royalty overcharges arise even if the
patent holder approaches the downstream firm before that firm has designed its
product).
205. Id.
206. See FTC REPORT, supra note 4, at Executive Summary 10
(“Recommendation 3: Tighten Certain Legal Standards Used to Evaluate
Whether A Patent Is ‘Obvious.’”); see also NAS REPORT, supra note 24, at 87
(suggesting a reinvigoration of the non-obviousness standard).
207. See FTC REPORT, supra note 4, at Executive Summary 16
(“Recommendation 9: Enact Legislation to Require, As a Predicate for Liability
for Willful Infringement, Either Actual, Written Notice of Infringement from the
Patentee, or Deliberate Copying of the Patentee’s Invention, Knowing It to Be
Patented.”); see also NAS REPORT, supra note 24, at 117 (recommending limiting
the subjective elements of patent litigation).
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infringers from the daunting “clear and convincing evidence” test
to a more rational “preponderance of the evidence” test, 208 and
curtailing the availability
of injunctions for patent
infringement. 209
Differential impact analysis has some interesting
implications for doctrinal reform. What may be most surprising is
that differential impact analysis is largely unsupportive of reform
to substantive patent doctrines. Although narrowing the scope of
willful infringement is clearly advantageous in terms of
differential impact, reforms such as raising the threshold of nonobviousness, lowering the burden of proof on patent challengers,
and curtailing the availability of injunctions for patent
infringement cannot be recommended on this basis. This does not
necessarily mean that such reforms are ill-advised, but it does
imply that they should not be a legislative priority at this time.
1. Raising the Threshold of Non-Obviousness
The meaning and implementation of the non-obviousness
standard has attracted a great deal of attention in the context of
bad patents. It is settled law that a patent should not be granted
if “the subject matter [of the invention] as a whole would have
been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person
having ordinary skill in the art.” 210 However, several decisions of
the Federal Circuit have combined to limit the capacity of the
Patent Office to reject a patent on the grounds of obviousness. 211
For example, the Federal Circuit does not allow a patent
examiner to reject an application using general knowledge,
common sense or the examiner’s own understanding or
experience unless that knowledge is “articulated and placed on
the record,” 212 a difficult standard to achieve in some cases. This
208. See, e.g., FTC REPORT, supra note 4, at Executive Summary 8
(“Recommendation 2: Enact Legislation to Specify that Challenges to the Validity
of a Patent Are To Be Determined Based on a ‘Preponderance of the Evidence.’”).
209. See, e.g., Michael J. Meurer, Controlling Opportunistic and AntiCompetitive Intellectual Property Litigation, 44. B.C. L. REV. 509, 511 (2003). A
significant area not addressed here is the scope of the experimental use defense.
See generally Katherine J. Strandburg, What Does The Public Get?: Experimental
Use And The Patent Bargain, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 81 (2004).
210. 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2000).
211. Bronwyn H. Hall & Dietmar Harhoff, Post-Grant Reviews in the U.S.
Patent System–Design Choices and Expected Impact, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
989, 999 (2004).
212. See, e.g., In re Lee, 277 F.3d 1338, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (general
knowledge); see also In re Zurko, 258 F.3d 1379, 1386 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
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requirement is intended to prevent the examiner from indulging
in hindsight, but it can also tie the hands of the Patent Office
such that it is unable to “reject something just because it’s
stupid.” 213
Whether or not the Supreme Court or the Federal Circuit
should raise the current standards of patentability relating to
obviousness (or patentable subject matter) is the subject of
legitimate debate. 214 The Supreme Court’s much anticipated
decision in KSR v. Teleflex is expected to address the question of
whether a finding of obviousness should require proof of some
suggestion or motivation to combine prior art references. 215 The
doctrinal arguments in favor of reforming the Federal Circuit’s
approach may be persuasive. It is difficult, however, to justify the
reform on the basis of the differential impact test set forth in this
article because changing the standards of patentability changes
what constitutes a bad patent. As a policy analysis tool,
differential impact only makes sense if we take the existing
standards of patentability as given. However, taking a broader
view, we believe that imposing a more rigorous standard in
relation to non-obviousness (and patentable subject matter)
would more closely link patent rights to activity that confers a
benefit on society.
2. Narrowing the Scope of Willful Infringement
The essential problem with the willful infringement doctrine
is that it allows a patent holder to carefully craft an “offer to
license” letter which puts a potential infringer on notice for
willful infringement but does not expose the patent to judicial
review. This oddity arises because the Federal Circuit sets a high

213. See supra note 1.
214. See, e.g., Brief for Intellectual Property Law Professors as Amici Curia in
Support of Petitioner at 2, KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 119 F. App’x 282 (Fed.
Cir. 2005) (No. 04-1350) (arguing that the Federal Circuit’s current approach to
non-obviousness is at odds with the statutory language, inconsistent with
Supreme Court precedent, and contrary to the goals of the patent system). But
see Christopher A. Cotropia, Patent Law Viewed Through an Evidentiary Lens:
The “Suggestion Test” as a Rule of Evidence 2 (Tul. Pub. L. Res. Paper No. 06-03,
2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=893965 (finding that the Federal
Circuit has not narrowed the suggestion test).
215. KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 126 S. Ct. 2965 (2006). The Federal
Circuit had held that a claimed invention cannot be held “obvious,” and thus
unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a), in the absence of some proven “'teaching,
suggestion or motivation' that would have led a person of ordinary skill in the art
to combine the relevant prior art teachings in the manner claimed.”. KSR Int’l
Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 119 F. App’x 282, 289-90 (Fed. Cir. 2005), cert. granted, 126
S. Ct. 2965 (2006).
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threshold for standing to seek a declaratory judgment, 216 but
imposes a low threshold for the notice required to trigger willful
infringement. 217 Before a potential infringer can file a motion for
declaratory judgment pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2201, she must
possess a “reasonable apprehension of suit.” 218 Federal Circuit
case law provides that the application of treble damages and
attorney’s fees is appropriate where an infringer had “actual
notice of [the plaintiff’s] patent rights” and failed “to exercise due
care to determine whether or not [she was] infringing” upon those
rights. 219 However, the Federal Circuit’s interpretation of “actual
notice” is so liberal that it can be satisfied by a company’s inhouse engineers or patent attorneys learning of the patent. 220
The steroidal nature of the willful infringement rule has
three predictable consequences. First, a significant number of
technology companies direct their personnel not to read
patents. 221 As technology industry representative recently
216. See O'Hagins, Inc. v. M5 Steel Mfg., Inc., 276 F. Supp. 2d 1020, 1024-25
(N.D. Cal. 2003) (explaining standards for standing).
217. See, e.g., SRI Int'l Inc. v. Advanced Tech. Labs. Inc., 127 F.3d 1462, 1470
(Fed. Cir. 1997) (holding that actual notice for the purposes of willful
infringement may be achieved without creating a case of actual controversy in
terms of the declaratory judgment statute). The defects of the current doctrine of
willful infringement have been thoroughly reviewed elsewhere. See, e.g., Timothy
R. Holbrook, Possession in Patent Law, 59 SMU L. REV. 123, 142-45 (2006);
Thomas F. Cotter, An Economic Analysis of Enhanced Damages and Attorney's
Fees for Willful Patent Infringement, 14 FED. CIR. B.J. 291 (2004/2005); Mark A.
Lemley & Ragesh K. Tangri, Ending Patent Law's Willfulness Game, 18
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1085, 1087 (2003).
218. See O'Hagins, Inc., 276 F. Supp. 2d at 1024-25.(holding that “actual
controversy” requires both “(1) an explicit threat or other action by the patentee,
which creates a reasonable apprehension on the part of the declaratory plaintiff
that it will face an infringement suit, and (2) present activity which could
constitute infringement or concrete steps taken with the intent to conduct such
activity.”) (internal quotations and citations omitted).
219. Underwater Devices Inc., 717 F.2d at 1389-91. Enhanced damages are
provided for in 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2000).
220. See Note, The Disclosure Function Of The Patent System (Or Lack
Thereof), 118 HARV. L. REV. 2007 (2005) (arguing that the Federal Circuit’s
development of the doctrine of willful infringement undermines the disclosure
function of the patent system by deterring innovators from reading patents to
protect themselves from treble damage awards in infringement suits); see also
Stryker Corp. v. Intermedics Orthopedics, Inc., 96 F.3d 1409, 1414-16 (Fed. Cir.
1996).
221. Transcript of Federal Trade Commission Public Hearing on Competition
and Intellectual Property Law and Policy in the Knowledge-Based Economy at
420–21 (Feb. 27, 2002) (statement of R. Jordan Greenhall), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/opp/intellect/020227trans.pdf; see also Timothy Holbrook,
Possession in Patent Law, 59 SMU L. REV. 123, 144 (2006) (discussing various
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commented:
[T]he penalty for so-called willful infringement makes [searching
patents] a really stupid idea . . . there’s a penalty applied to it if you find
patents that later on somebody says you infringe. You can be fined, you
can be liable for triple damages. 222

Second, when they cannot avoid learning about the existence
of a patent, many companies will obtain non-infringement
opinions in order to demonstrate their exercise of due care in
avoiding infringement. 223 Third, some alleged infringers settle
cases they might otherwise pursue because of fear of attorneys
fees and treble damages.
The possibility of willful infringement increases the penalties
for unsuccessfully challenging an assertion of patent rights.
Furthermore, the zone of immunity between vague assertion and
actions which create a reasonable apprehension of suit
encourages patent owners to broadly and indiscriminately assert
their rights. In effect, patent holders who provide “notice” of their
rights that falls short of the declaratory judgment standard get
something for nothing – the patent holder raises the alleged
infringer’s expected cost of challenging the patent without
increasing her own expected cost of retaliation. To quote one
general counsel:
We worry about these letters because of things like the willfulness
standard. It would be great if I could just say this is ridiculous and
throw it in the trash can. We obviously can’t do that. We engaged in a
very reasoned analysis and, in some cases, we get very expensive
opinions of counsel which, in some cases, sit on the shelf because you
never hear again. In fact, most of the time you never hear again, but
that does not mean it is free to me. We also get a lot of what I call
“squirrelly” letters [which say] “We noticed that you recently announced
your such and such feature. We think that you might be interested or
benefited from taking a license to our portfolio.” So are they accusing me
of something? Well, I do not know the answer to that, but I can
guarantee you if there is litigation, they are going to say they did, and I

disincentives to read patents and patent applications).
222. Transcript of Federal Trade Commission Public Hearing on Competition
and Intellectual Property Law and Policy in the Knowledge-Based Economy at
677 (Feb. 28, 2002) (statement of Robert Barr), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/opp/intellect/020228ftc.pdf.
223. See, e.g., Transcript of Federal Trade Commission Public Hearing on
Competition and Intellectual Property Law and Policy in the Knowledge-Based
Economy at 155 (Oct. 25, 2002) (statement of John R. Thomas), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/opp/intellect/021025trans.pdf (“First, we've heard that it
supposedly incents opinion of counsel to guide accused infringers, but in fact, it's
pretty commonly known in the patent bar that most of the opinions produced by
counsel are commonly known as non-infringement and invalidity opinions
because that's inevitably the advice that they give.”).
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The House Bill will have a differential impact on bad patents
by aligning the standards for willfulness and standing for
declaratory judgment. The House Bill eliminates the willfulness
zone and reduces the incentives for patent holders to make
indiscriminate “offers to license” by narrowing the application of
willful infringement. The House Bill narrows the permitted
grounds for finding willful infringement to cases where the patent
owner presents clear and convincing evidence of one of two
things. First, that the infringer either intentionally copied the
patented invention with knowledge that it was patented; 225 or
second, that the infringer received written notice from the
patentee alleging acts of infringement in a manner sufficient to
give the infringer an objectively reasonable apprehension of suit
on such patent. 226 The proposed legislation also restricts when a
patent holder can plead willful infringement such that no
determination of willfulness can be made before issues of validity
and infringement are determined by the court. 227 Eliminating the
willfulness zone will have a differential impact because patent
holders will no longer be able to raise the stakes for alleged
infringers without increasing their own exposure to retaliation.
This has a differential impact because bad patents are more likely
to be invalidated on declaratory judgment.
3. Eliminating the Clear and Convincing Evidence Standard
The Federal Circuit has interpreted the Patent Act’s
presumption of validity for issued patents to mean that a
potential infringer seeking to invalidate a patent must prove by
“clear and convincing evidence” that the patent is invalid. 228 This

224. Edited and Excerpted Transcript of the Symposium on Ideas into Action:
Implementing Reform of the Patent System, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1053, 1128–
29 (2003).
225. Patents Depend on Quality Act of 2006, H.R. 5096, 109th Cong. § 6
(2006) (proposing to amend 35 U.S.C. 284). The House Bill also provides that
damages for willful infringement may be awarded against a party if, “after
having been found by a court to have infringed that patent, the infringer engaged
in conduct that was not colorably different from the conduct previously found to
have infringed the patent, and which resulted in a separate finding of
infringement of the same patent.” Id.
226. Id.
227. Id. Also note that the court’s determination of an infringer’s willfulness
shall be made without a jury.
228. See, e.g., Kegel Co. Inc. v. AMF Bowling, Inc., 127 F.3d 1420, 1429 (Fed.
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heightened burden of proof for those wishing to challenge a
patent’s validity is intended to safeguard patent holders from
frivolous and unsubstantiated attacks. However, the application
of this high evidentiary threshold is difficult to reconcile with the
realities of modern patent examination. 229 We do not know what
proportion of patents are wrongly issued by the Patent Office, but
we do know that roughly half of all litigated patents turn out to
be invalid. 230 As such, the clear and convincing evidence standard
is frequently considered a prime candidate for revision. 231
Although we concede that the clear and convincing evidence
of invalidity may have outlived its usefulness, we do not
recommend simply changing to the more common preponderance
of the evidence test. Lowering the standard of proof required to
challenge patent validity will not necessarily have a significantly
differential impact on bad patents; instead, it is more likely to
decrease the value of all patents, regardless of whether they are
good or bad. Arguably, lowering the burden of proof with respect
to invalidity may have a weakly differential impact – that is, one
that would devalue both good and bad patents but have a greater
effect on bad ones. Even if this is the case, it does not provide a
strong basis for doctrinal reform. Lowering the burden of proof for
challenging the validity of a patent would certainly decrease the
potential extortion of bad patents, but it would also devalue the
patent portfolios of every good patent holder by making them
more easily subject to unwarranted challenges. In Part IV of this
article we propose a variable presumption of validity as an
alternative to changing the standard. This would have a
significantly differential impact. 232
4. Curtailing the Availability of Injunctions for Patent
Infringement
In eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, the Supreme Court rejected

Cir. 1997) (“Invalidity must be established by facts supported by clear and
convincing evidence”).
229. See, e.g., Lemley, supra note 22, at 1528. The presumption of validity has
little if any basis in fact. Examiners do not in fact spend long hours poring over a
patent application or the prior art. They spend very little time, and far less than
either the lawyers or the triers of fact in infringement cases. They regularly miss
the most relevant prior art. Id., see also Mark A. Lemley et al., What to do About
10
(2005-06),
available
at
Bad
Patents,
28
REGULATION
http://ssrn.com/abstract=869826.
230. Allison & Lemley, supra note 49, at 205 (stating only 54% of the patents
were found valid in a population of 300 final validity decisions).
231. See FTC REPORT, supra note 4, at Executive Summary 8.
232. See infra Part IV.
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the Federal Circuit’s automatic imposition of an injunction for
patent infringement and held that “according to well-established
principles of equity, a plaintiff [must] satisfy a four-factor test
before a court may grant relief [in the form of a permanent
injunction].” 233 To obtain a permanent injunction a plaintiff must
demonstrate:
(1) that it has suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that remedies available
at law, such as monetary damages, are inadequate to compensate for
that injury; (3) that, considering the balance of hardships between the
plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted; and (4) that
the public interest would not be disserved by a permanent injunction. 234

If passed, the House Bill will slightly amplify the effect of the
Supreme Court’s ruling in eBay. The House Bill reaffirms the
equitable nature of injunctions and requires judges to act “in
accordance with the principles of equity” and to apply injunctions
on such terms as they deem fair. 235 Significantly, the House Bill
provides for an automatic stay of any injunction pending appeal if
the defendant is able to show that “the stay would not result in
irreparable harm to the owner of the patent and that the balance
of hardships from the stay does not favor the owner of the
patent.” 236
The arguments for and against granting injunctions in favor
of non-practicing entities have been covered extensively in the
legal literature and before the Supreme Court in its consideration
of the eBay case. 237 In terms of the differential impact test, it
should be noted that the ability to obtain a final injunction adds
significant negotiating leverage to good and bad patents alike.
There may well be good reasons to relax the Federal Circuit’s
inflexible stance toward final injunctions, but this particular
reform is not a high priority in terms of differential impact. 238

233. eBay Inc., 126 S. Ct. at 1839.
234. Id.
235. Patents Depend on Quality Act of 2006, H.R. 5096, 109th Cong. § 8
(2006) (proposing to amend 35 U.S.C. 283). The fairness language does not
appear in the rival Senate Bill.
236. Id.
237. See, e.g., Brief Amici Curiae of 52 Intellectual Property Professors in
Support of Petitioners, eBay v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 126 S. Ct. 1837 (2006) (No.
05-130); Brief of Various Law & Economics Professors as Amici Curiae in
Support of Respondent, eBay v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 126 S. Ct. 1837 (2006)
(No. 05-130).
238. Arguably making it more difficult to obtain preliminary injunctions may
have a differential impact on bad patents.
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C. LITIGATION REFORM
In addition to changes to Patent Office procedure and
substantive patent doctrines discussed above, Congress is also
being asked to consider major changes to the entire structure
through which patent disputes are litigated. Again, there is a
considerable array of reform proposals on the table ranging from
providing incentives for third party patent bounty hunters,
facilitating collective action by alleged infringers, to creating an
administrative review system for determining patent validity as
an alternative to district court litigation.
As discussed in Part II, the CF-model shows that the high
cost of patent litigation insulates bad patents from effective
challenge in many cases. The AF-model shows the patent holder’s
decision to assert is directly tied to the probability that their
targets will retaliate and the potential harm that retaliation
might cause. Both models indicate that changes to the structure
of patent litigation have significant potential to affect the
behavior of patent holders and potential infringers. The question
we address in this section is the extent to which the litigation
reform proposals currently being debated are likely to have a
differential impact on bad patents.
1. Fee-Shifting and Bounty Hunter Proposals
The three bounty/fee-shifting proposals reviewed below
illustrate the diversity of recommendations on the Congressional
table. For example, John Thomas proposes encouraging third
parties to assist the Patent Office in its search for invalidating
prior art by rewarding them with a bounty for any relevant prior
art that reads on the purported invention. 239 Under the Thomas
proposal, the Patent Office would publish the patent application
and invite the public to submit prior art before the patent is
issued. 240 If application claims are rejected based on these third
party submissions of prior art, the submitting party would receive
a bounty determined by the Patent Office and paid by the
As an alternative, Joseph Miller advocates a
applicant. 241
litigation stage bounty. 242 Miller suggests that third parties
239. John R. Thomas, Collusion and Collective Action in the Patent System: A
Proposal for Patent Bounties, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 305, 342 (2001).
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. Miller, supra note 22. Miller argues that the Thomas proposal occurs too
early in the process and that third parties would be unable to determine whether
the technology represented in the application is commercially valuable. See id. at
704.
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should receive a bounty in situations where the “court voids a
patent claim on a ground that the patentee could have prevented
by diligently and candidly researching, drafting, and prosecuting
its patent application.” 243
Jay Kesan offers a related, but distinct proposal. Kesan
proposes a one-way, pro-defendant, fee-shifting system in which
the patent holder pays the costs of litigation if at least some of the
patent claims are invalidated on the basis of prior art which was
reasonably discoverable by the patentee during prosecution. 244
Ordinarily a patent holder has very little incentive to diligently
research the prior art or to submit only those claims that are
likely to survive litigation stage review. However, punishing the
patent holder in those cases where reasonable and diligent
research would have suggested that the patent claims were
invalid changes the patent holder’s incentives at the time of
prosecution. Patent holders who choose not to conduct thorough
prior art searches either during prosecution or before attempting
to enforce their patents would expose themselves to increased
litigation costs if their claims prove to be invalid. 245
The fee-shifting and bounty hunter proposals outlined above
effectively raise the alleged infringer’s expected gains from
challenging a patent, or, alternatively, lower the patent holder’s
expected gains from asserting her patent. The bounty hunter
proposals are effectively penalties for improvident patent
drafting, whereas Kesan’s fee-shifting proposal constitutes a
penalty for asserting an improvidently drafted patent. Both
measures may have a differential impact because bad patents
have a higher average probability of triggering these costs.
However, there is a risk that the fee-shifting and bounty
hunter proposals might be too aggressive in their attempt to
enhance the incentives to challenge patents. Penalizing
improvident patent drafting should stimulate patent holders to
improve patent quality at the application stage, but the resulting
increased expenditure is not necessarily efficient given that the
commercial value of the innovation will often be unknown at the
243. Id. at 707. Miller’s bounty system would thus incorporate challenges to
best mode, enablement, and possibly inequitable conduct by the patent applicant
before the PTO. Miller would seek to overcome the problems he identifies in the
Thomas proposal by tying the amount of the bounty awarded to the patent
holder’s past profits. This would provide incentives to challenge only those
patents likely to be commercially valuable. Id. at 711-12.
244. Kesan, supra note 22, at 787, 795.
245. Id. at 795.
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time of drafting. If these penalties are reserved for those patent
holders who fail to look for and disclose even the most readily
available prior art, then they should not trouble good patent
holders too much. But, if such penalties are more broadly
applied, they may substantially raise the legal costs of all patent
prosecution in a way that discriminates more in relation to the
budget constraints of the patentee than the quality of their
patents. Indeed, reforms centered on bounties and fee shifting
may simply create disparities according to patent holder risk
tolerance as opposed to their identity as either good or bad patent
holders. 246
Furthermore, larger companies are unlikely to view the
bounty payoff as a significant revenue stream. Therefore, their
incentives to challenge patents will remain unchanged with
respect to the current system. Smaller niche firms may form
solely for the purposes of submitting prior art in anticipation of
bounty payouts. This would be mitigated by the requirement of
submission fees, but still leaves open the possibility of continuing
patent attacks by non-interested parties based solely on financial
reward incentives. Such a scenario inevitably leads to a lowquality of third party prior art submissions and thus an increase
of costs across the board for all patent prosecution.
Jay Kesan’s fee-shifting proposal is more promising than the
bounty hunter proposals in terms of its differential impact.
Ordinarily, a patent holder has very little incentive to diligently
research the prior art or to submit only those claims that are
likely to survive litigation stage review. Fee-shifting would
attack this problem by effectively punishing the patent holder in
those cases where reasonable and diligent research would have
suggested that the patent claims were invalid.
Fee-shifting should have two significant effects. First, the
prospect of fee-shifting changes the patent holder’s incentives at
the time of prosecution. The risk of suffering an adverse award of
costs should make at least some patent applicants consider
performing a more thorough prior art search during prosecution
and/or before attempting to enforce the patent. 247 Second, the
prospect of fee-shifting should also reduce the incentives of
potential infringers to settle strong invalidation cases early.
Fee-shifting appears to have a differential impact because
although all patent holders face slightly greater risks when they
246. Id. at 796 (acknowledging that fee shifting imposes a heavier burden on
poor companies which may not be able to bear the increased costs of prosecution
or pre-litigation search actions).
247. Id. at 795.
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attempt to enforce their patents, the magnitude of those risks is
tied to the quality of the underlying patent. However, it should be
noted that its actual effects in the patent context are somewhat
speculative. A study of the effect of fee-shifting in Florida medical
malpractice cases indicates that fee-shifting both encourages
those with strong cases to pursue their claims while discouraging
those with weak cases. 248 If this also held true for patent
litigation it would mean that fee-shifting would have a clearly
differential impact on bad patents. However, there are at least
two caveats about fee-shifting. First, there is surprisingly little
agreement among theoreticians as to the effect of fee-shifting on
litigation in general. 249 Second, the few empirical studies that
have been performed on the effect of fee-shifting have not been in
the area of patent law. It is conceivable that a study involving
Florida medical malpractice litigation may have entirely different
idiosyncrasies than studies of federal patent litigation. 250
The Senate Bill appears to have embraced the idea of feeshifting, albeit not in the form suggested by Kesan. Section 5 of
the Senate Bill requires courts to award attorneys’ fees to a
prevailing party in cases where the non-prevailing party’s legal
position was not “substantially justified.” 251 The Senate Bill
departs from Kesan’s proposal in two ways. First, Kesan proposes
a pro-defendant one-way fee-shifting scheme, whereas the feeshifting rule proposed in the Senate Bill would apply to either the
patent owner or the alleged infringer. Second, the Senate Bill’s
threshold of lack of substantial justification means that the
provision is less likely to be invoked than Kesan’s standard of
undisclosed prior art being reasonably discoverable by the
patentee during prosecution. 252
Although there are reasons to hope that fee-shifting will have
a differential impact on bad patents, fee-shifting alone is not a
complete solution. First, fee-shifting does nothing to address the
248. Herbert M. Kritzer, Lawyer Fees and Lawyer Behavior in Litigation:
What does the Empirical Literature Really Say?, 80 TEXAS L. REV. 1943, 1949-50
(2002).
249. Id. at 1947–48 (“scholars have considered the impact of fee shifting on . .
. [with] surprisingly little agreement”).
250. Id. at 1950 (Kritzer summarizes the findings of a study of the effect of
fee-shifting in Florida medical malpractice cases as follows: fee-shifting
“encourages some plaintiffs (those with strong cases) to pursue their claims while
discouraging others (those with weak cases). The result is to reduce the frequency
of low-merit claims.”).
251. Patent Reform Act of 2006, S. 3818, 109th Cong. § 5 (2006).
252. Kesan, supra note 22, at 787, 795.
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issue of delay in federal court litigation. Second, fee-shifting is
only effective if patent holders have the resources to pay an
award of costs. Finally, the prospect of fee-shifting may have a
chilling effect on the assertion of good patents held by risk-averse
entities.
2. Facilitating Collective Action
Carl Shapiro has suggested that one solution to the problem
of bad patents is to make it easier for government agencies with
an interest in consumer welfare such as the FTC, or public
interest advocacy groups such as The Electronic Frontier
Foundation and the Public Patent Foundation to challenge the
validity of suspect patents. 253 Shapiro further suggests that the
antitrust authorities should make it easier for potential infringers
to collectively defend their rights by “making it clear that
cooperative efforts to challenge patents will generally not be
considered illegal collusion, even when such efforts involve
horizontal rivals who are seeking to pay less for a technological
input, or license.” 254
Edward Hsieh proposes facilitating cooperation among
alleged infringers by allowing for the mandatory joinder of all
potential defendants and thus consolidating all defendants in a
single action. He argues that mandatory joinder would lower the
individual defendant’s costs of litigation, reduce overall litigation
costs, prevent patentees from suing smaller companies first, and
encourage defendants to challenge bad patents. 255
Cooperative patent challenges and mandatory joinder are
both aimed at solving collective action problems relating to patent
litigation. The difference between the two proposals is that the
first merely facilitates collective defense by potential infringers,
the second is actually coercive. From the perspective of
differential impact, the problem with facilitating collective action
is that there is nothing to suggest that potential infringers will
act collusively to defeat bad patents more than they will act
collusively to defeat good patents.

253. See Carl Shapiro, Patent System Reform: Economic Analysis and
Critique, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1017, 1040–41 (2004); see also, Lemley &
Shapiro, supra note 89.
254. Shapiro, supra note 253, at 1041.
255. Hsieh, supra note 89.
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3. Post-Grant Review
The FTC, the NAS and a wide array of commentators have
urged Congress to authorize the Patent Office to administer a
system of post-grant review of patent validity (post-grant
review). 256 Post-grant review would supplement the current third
party and inter-partes reexamination systems, which are rarely
used because of their prejudicial estoppel effects. 257 The Patent
Act provides that any issue raised by a challenger during
reexamination cannot be revisited in a later trial involving that
challenger. 258 This means that any potential infringer who tries
to invalidate a patent through reexamination must be willing to
risk that the Patent Office will decide in its favor. The challenger
has no opportunity to litigate any argument or prior art evidence
used in reexamination should the Patent Office make a mistake.
This estoppel effect makes reexamination extremely risky unless
a potential infringer is already engaged in federal court
litigation. 259
According to its proponents, post-grant review would
drastically reduce the cost of challenging bad patents and
therefore help private parties fill the gaps left by an incomplete
examination process. In the words of Rep. Lamar Smith, a
system of post-grant review will “provide meaningful, low-cost
alternatives to litigation for challenging the patent validity.” 260
Senator Orrin Hatch explains the need for post-grant review as
follows:
[B]y adopting a more robust post-grant review proceeding we are
providing a more efficient means of challenging a patent’s validity in an
administrative proceeding. This is necessary to address systemic
problems in our patent system, making post-grant review an essential
component of any meaningful reform legislation. While there appears to
be substantial agreement regarding the need for a more meaningful
post-issuance review, there are strong disagreements over its specific
attributes and scope. 261

256. See FTC REPORT, supra note 4, at 7 (Recommendation 1); NAS REPORT,
supra note 24, at 95 (Recommendation 3); see also Patents Depend on Quality Act
of 2006, H.R. 5096, 109th Cong. § 2 (2006); S. 3818 § 6.
257. Farrell & Merges, supra note 22, at 966 (citing only 392 ex parte
reexamination requests in 2003).
258. 35 U.S.C. § 317 (2000).
259. Farrell & Merges, supra note 22, at 967 (noting that the broad consensus
among patent experts is that the risks of reexamination are too great).
260. 151 CONG. REC. E1160 (daily ed. June 8, 2005) (statement of Rep.
Smith).
261. 152 CONG. REC. S8804-01, S8830 (daily ed. Aug. 3, 2006) (statement of
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Post-grant review of issued patents has enormous potential
to discourage and devalue bad patents without undermining the
value of good patents in three ways: (i) post-grant review will
provide a low cost method of challenging patents and thus
prevent bad patent holders from hiding behind the high cost of
federal court litigation; (ii) post-grant review will increase the
expected cost of retaliation for asserting a bad patent without
(significantly) increasing the expected cost of retaliation for
asserting a good patent; and (iii) post-grant review will reduce
uncertainty and information asymmetries relating to patent
quality.
First, by reducing the cost of challenging the validity of an
issued patent in some cases, post-grant review will make it more
difficult for bad patent holders to simply rely on the high cost of
federal court litigation to insulate them from challenges. Recall
that the main implication of the CF-model was that the higher
litigation costs rise, the less likely an alleged infringer will be to
challenge the validity of a patent. The CF-model also
demonstrated that in a large number of cases, having a high
probability of successfully challenging a patent was not enough to
ensure that the challenge would in fact be made. When the cost of
successful litigation is more than the cost of licensing, it does not
appear to make sense to challenge a patent, no matter how sure
one is that such a challenge would be successful. 262 Post-grant
review is significant in this context because it lowers the
minimum threshold of litigation from hundreds of thousands of
dollars to merely tens of thousands of dollars.
A high minimum threshold of litigation gives bad patent
holders the flexibility to demand licensing fees from multiple
alleged infringers that are considerable but would not make it
worthwhile for any one alleged infringer to challenge the patent.
For example, a patent holder can usually demand $50,000 from
twenty different alleged infringers and be fairly certain that none
will challenge the patent’s validity in court. However, if postgrant review allows a potential infringer to challenge the validity
of the patent for a mere $25,000, 263 the patent holder can expect
to encounter serious opposition from potential infringers who

Sen. Hatch).
262. Admittedly, some potential infringers may challenge in such a situation
if they have a strong reputation interest in not being seen to be an easy target.
Nonetheless, the simplified parameters of the CF-model probably capture the
behavior of a majority of firms.
263. This is merely an example; the actual costs of post-grant review are hard
to estimate at this point.
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believe that the patent has obvious defects. In theory, the holder
of a bad patent could still attempt to play the same game under a
post-grant review regime, but that would require demanding
almost negligible royalty rates. Licensing demands that are
pitched too low will immediately signal to potential infringers
that the patent holder has very little confidence in her ability to
enforce the patent.
Second, post-grant review will have a differential impact on
bad patents by increasing the expected cost of retaliation for
asserting a bad patent without increasing the expected cost of
retaliation for asserting a good patent, or at least without
increasing it significantly. The AF-model discussed earlier
indicates that increasing the expected cost of retaliation reduces
the patent holder’s incentive to assert her patent. 264 It follows
that increasing the expected cost of retaliation for bad patents
without significantly increasing the expected cost of retaliation
for good patents will reduce the assertion of bad patents relative
to good ones. By substantially reducing the monetary cost of
challenging a patent’s validity, post-grant review will expose all
patent holders to an increased threat of retaliation when they
assert their patent rights. However, post-grant review still has a
differential impact because the expected cost of that retaliation
should be much lower for good patents than for bad ones.
Post-grant review has a more significant differential impact
than would be achieved by simply lowering the cost of federal
court litigation. Post-grant review is different from federal court
litigation for two reasons. The first is that the high cost and delay
of full scale patent litigation is a significant detriment to both
good and bad patent holders alike. The second is that good patent
holders continue to face a significant chance of losing in federal
court because of the uncertainties of litigation generally, the risk
of judicial error and fluctuations in patent law doctrine. 265 Figure
2 illustrates this point using the same sliding scale of patent
validity as in Figure 1. 266 Just as in Figure 1, the closer a patent
is to the left hand side of the scale, the more likely it is to be
upheld (or found to be infringed) by a court. Figure 2 depicts four
patents; Patent A has a 95% chance of being found to be valid,
Patent B has 60% chance, Patent C has a 50% chance and Patent
D has a 5% chance.
264. See supra Part II.E.
265. See supra Part II.D.
266. See supra note 171 and accompanying text.
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FIGURE 2(a): PATENTS AT RISK IF LITIGATED
At risk if litigated
Valid

Invalid
A

BC

D

FIGURE 2(b): PATENTS AT RISK UNDER POST-GRANT REVIEW

Post grant
review
Valid

Invalid
A

BC

D

As Figure 2(a) illustrates, although Patent D is far more
likely to be invalidated through litigation, Patents B and C are
also at risk. In contrast, as depicted in Figure 2(b), the narrower
scope of post-grant review should only place Patent D in jeopardy.
Good patent holders should only face a very slight risk from postgrant review if post-grant review is only intended to filter out
patents that clearly fail to satisfy the statutory grounds of
patentability. Post-grant review, generally, will not be a viable
method for determining the validity of Patents B and C because
the information required to make such fine-grained
determinations will typically not be available at such an early
stage. In addition, as discussed in more detail below, the expected
cost of retaliation in the form of post-grant review should be much
lower for good patents than for bad ones because good patents
actually benefit from being subjected to the review process.
Finally, post-grant review will have a differential impact on
bad patents by reducing uncertainty and information
asymmetries relating to patent quality. As discussed in relation
to the CF-model, would-be patent challengers face significant
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information costs in assessing patent quality. When a firm first
receives some notification that it may be infringing another
person’s patent rights, it needs to form a view as to both the
merits of that allegation and the likelihood that the patent holder
will pursue it. Obtaining this information is costly because bad
patent holders will go as far as possible to imitate good patent
holders in terms of the royalties they demand and their apparent
willingness to go to court. Consequently, uncertainty and
information asymmetries relating to patent quality have a
leveling out effect; they increase the targets’ willingness to accept
a license from bad patent holders and reduce their willingness to
accept a license from good patent holders.
Post-grant review ameliorates this problem by providing a
more credible signal of patent quality. Patents that survive postgrant review are more likely to be taken seriously in the market
than ones that have never been tested. If post-grant review
functions as intended, it will not only expose patents that should
never have been granted, it will also signal the merits of patents
that are reviewed and not found invalid. Not only does post-grant
review provide a way to screen out some bad patents, it also
provides credible information to the market about good patents.
In this way, post-grant review provides a signal of patent quality
for good patents that bad patent holders face great costs in
imitating. Furthermore, if the model for post-grant review we
propose in Part IV of this article is adopted, patents that survive
post-grant review will not only appear stronger, they will be
entitled to a stronger presumption of validity in litigation.
D. ASSESSING PATENT REFORM ON THE BASIS OF DIFFERENTIAL
IMPACT
The purpose of this section was to directly apply the
differential impact test to a broad survey of current patent reform
proposals, including those embodied in the latest version of the
House Bill and the Senate Bill. Before summarizing our
conclusions, it is important to stress that we are not suggesting
that reforms that are unlikely to have a differential impact on
bad patents are necessarily ill-conceived, rather, we are simply
arguing that such reforms should not be a legislative priority at
this time.
Our main conclusions with respect to the differential impact
potential for the reforms analyzed in this article are as follows. In
applying the differential impact test to the multitude of
examination reforms that have been suggested, we noted that
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proposals which simply call for the optimization of current
resources should be considered to be neutral in terms of
differential impact. In contrast, devoting additional resources to
patent examination is unlikely to have a differential impact on
bad patents that would justify the additional expenditure. We
did conclude, however, that the three examination reforms
proposed under the House Bill, first-to-file, pre-grant opposition
and mandatory publication of all patent applications after
eighteen months, are all justified under a differential impact
analysis. 267
Doctrinal reforms generally did not fare well when assessed
against the differential impact standard. Of the four main areas
of doctrinal reform reviewed, only narrowing the scope of willful
infringement is strongly recommended under a differential
impact analysis.
Post-grant review and other changes to the structure of
patent litigation have significant potential to create a differential
impact on bad patents. Specifically, we concluded that fee-shifting
may encourage good patent holders to pursue their cases while
simultaneously discouraging bad patent holders. Proposals
relating to bounties and cooperative patent challenges did not
appear to be justified in terms of differential impact. Of all the
reforms surveyed, establishing a forum for the post-grant review
of issued patents has the most potential to discourage and
devalue bad patents without undermining the value of good
patents. Post-grant review has three key advantages in this
respect: (i) it will provide a low cost method of challenging patents
and thus prevent bad patent holders from hiding behind the high
cost of federal court litigation; (ii) it will increase the expected
cost of retaliation for asserting a bad patent without significantly
increasing the expected cost of retaliation for asserting a good
patent; and (iii) it will reduce uncertainty and information
asymmetries relating to patent quality.
PART IV. MULTISTAGE POST-GRANT REVIEW
Under the differential impact test elaborated in this article,
we have proposed that the current legislative push in relation to
patent reform should specifically address problems related to bad
patents. To reiterate, Congress should defer consideration of
reforms that attempt to either strengthen or weaken the
exclusive rights of patent holders generally in favor of reforms
267. Although note that our reasoning with respect to the first-to-file
recommendation is slightly different.
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that are likely to raise the costs of obtaining or enforcing bad
patents significantly more than they raise the costs of obtaining
or enforcing good patents.
As discussed in the previous Part, the differential impact test
supports the adoption of some type of post-grant review
system. 268 In this Part we explain how the differential impact
test not only supports the idea of post-grant review in general,
but also can be applied to build a better model for post-grant
review than those currently on the table. In short, looking at postgrant review through the lens of differential impact leads us to
propose a very different kind of system from those embodied in
the House Bill, the Senate Bill or those proposed by the FTC, the
NAS and various other commentators.
There are three key differences between our proposal and
other variations of post-grant review. First, we propose the
adoption of a variable presumption of validity such that: (i) issued
patents would only receive a weak presumption of validity (i.e.
they would not be subject to the clear and convincing evidence
standard); (ii) patents that have been unsuccessfully challenged
in post-grant review would be entitled to a strong presumption of
validity (including the clear and convincing evidence standard);
and (iii) rather than automatically invalidating a patent that is
successfully challenged in post-grant review, such patents would
merely be weakened by attaching a presumption of invalidity.
Second, we propose a multiple stage system of post-grant
review, (“MPGR”) with two distinct stages in order to balance the
goal of greater scrutiny for bad patents with the need to minimize
potential harassment of good patents. The main benefit of postgrant review should be that it allows potential infringers a low
cost opportunity to correct what they believe to be obvious errors
by the Patent Office. However, if that opportunity is made too
freely available, it may be overused by well resourced potential
infringers to chill the assertion of good patents. Finding the right
balance between lowering the cost of challenging bad patents and
preventing harassment of good patents can be achieved by using
multiple stages of review under the MPGR process.
Third, we propose bringing questions of claim construction
into post-grant review so that both sides of the bad patent
phenomenon can be addressed. Patents that should never have
been issued receive most of the attention in the bad patent
debate, however the hyper-assertion of vaguely worded claims
268. See supra Part III.D.
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has at least as much potential to damage the incentive function of
the patent system. 269 To meaningfully address the bad patent
phenomenon, post-grant review must find a way to deal with
patents that may be legitimate in one sense but are illegitimately
asserted beyond their natural scope.
A. A VARIABLE PRESUMPTION OF VALIDITY
Differential impact analysis indicates that calls for the
abolition of the clear and convincing evidence standard may be
misconceived. 270 While it is true that the application of the clear
and convincing evidence standard in relation to patent validity is
difficult to reconcile with the realities of modern patent
examination, it does not seem likely that lowering the standard of
proof required to challenge patent validity will have a differential
impact on bad patents. The main reason for this is that the
presumption of validity and the clear and convincing evidence
standard together provide significant protection against
adjudicative error for good patents as well as bad ones.
However, none of the arguments in favor of retaining the
strong form of the presumption of validity (i.e. presumption of
validity plus convincing evidence standard) require that all
patents should be subject to the one evidentiary standard. As an
alternative to simply keeping or abolishing the strong form of the
presumption of validity, we propose the application of a variable
presumption of validity tied to post-grant review. 271
Under the current system an applicant can obtain a patent
without definitively proving anything at the Patent Office.
Nonetheless, once that patent issues, it can only be invalidated
through clear and convincing evidence. 272 Post-grant review
269. In Part I we explained that the term “bad patent” should be reserved for
patents that are asserted to cover a product or activity that no reasonable fact
finder could find it covered. See supra Part I.B.
270. See supra Part III.B.
271. Mark Lemley and his coauthors have also proposed a variable
presumption of validity in a slightly different context. Their proposal is that
“applicants should be allowed to ‘gold-plate’ their patents by paying for the kind
of searching review that would merit a strong presumption of validity” but
otherwise a weaker form of the presumption of validity should apply. Lemley et
al., supra note 229, at 12. Although this may sound like a radical shift from
current practice, it must be noted that current reexamination procedures allow
the presumption of validity to be overcome by a preponderance of the evidence
and can result in the cancellation of the patent. Consolidated Patent Rules, 37
C.F.R. § 1.555 (2007). Note also, that in some pre-Federal Circuit cases, the
presumption of validity was eliminated if the prior art in court was not before the
Patent Office.
272. See, e.g., Kegel Company, Inc. v. AMF Bowling, Inc., 127 F.3d 1420, 1429
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provides us with an excellent opportunity to revisit the one-sizefits-all application of the presumption of validity with something
that is both more rational and more nuanced.
The presumption of invalidity means that a patent that is
successfully challenged would still be valid in a technical sense
but that if the patent holder wished to enforce it against a
potential infringer she would face an uphill battle in court. The
presumption of invalidity quite literally means that the patent is
presumed to be invalid as an evidentiary matter, but that if the
patent holder can show, on the preponderance of the evidence,
that their patent is valid and infringed, she is entitled to enforce
her rights. In that case, the patent would then be entitled to the
strong presumption of validity.
We propose that issued patents should generally only be
entitled to a weak presumption of validity: i.e. they should be
presumed valid, but could be invalidated by a preponderance of
the evidence rather than the onerous clear and convincing
evidence standard. Once a patent has been challenged in postgrant review and is upheld, it should then be entitled to a
stronger presumption of validity. Treating reviewed and unreviewed patents differently is consistent with the differential
impact approach because patents that have been unsuccessfully
challenged via post-grant review (or litigation) are less likely to
be bad patents. We cannot be certain that an unsuccessfully
challenged patent will not later be shown to be invalid, but we
can be relatively confident that such invalidation will not be
easily achieved.
We further propose that rather than automatically
invalidating a patent that is successfully challenged in post-grant
review, such patents should merely be weakened by attaching a
presumption of invalidity. This is a significant departure from the
current reexamination system and from the post-grant review
proposals presently before Congress. By lowering the stakes of
post-grant review, the presumption of invalidity makes the lack of
appeal rights and other procedural safeguards with respect to
post-grant review more palatable. 273
One of the advantages of merely applying a presumption of
invalidity to a patent that is discredited in post-grant review is
that it facilitates a streamlined process within the Patent Office
(Fed. Cir. 1997) (holding that invalidity must be established by facts supported
by clear and convincing evidence).
273. See infra Part IV.D.
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that does not deprive the patent holder of due process. 274 Patent
holders would not be able to appeal patent review decisions, but
their ability to pursue subsequent litigation should be an effective
substitute. We expect that in most cases a patent holder who
loses in post-grant review will see the writing on the wall and
abandon attempts to enforce the patent; however, those patent
holders who believe that the Patent Office has incorrectly ruled
against their patent still have the option of proving the validity of
their patent in litigation. In some ways, the model of post-grant
review we propose here is more about information revelation than
adjudication. Nonetheless, in terms of the CF-model, post-grant
review will function as a low cost form of adjudication for a large
number of cases, even if it is not the final forum of dispute for all
controversies.
The difference between the variable presumption of validity
and the current patent system is illustrated in Table 1, below. As
the table makes clear, the current system is indiscriminate in
that it subjects reviewed and un-reviewed patents to the same
strong form of the presumption of validity. The current system
also suffers in that both post-grant review and litigation can lead
to exactly the same outcome, thus setting up the potential for
contradictory outcomes. Our proposal adopts an escalating
structure that acknowledges the differences between reviewed
and un-reviewed patents as well as between post-grant review
and actual litigation.
TABLE 1: THE PRESUMPTION OF VALIDITY

274. Under the current reexamination system decisions of the Patent Office
are appealable to the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences. See 35 U.S.C. §
134 (2000).
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Current System

Reform Proposal

Patent issued

Strong Presumption
of Validity

Weak Presumption
of Validity

Post-grant review
upholds patent

Strong Presumption
of Validity

Strong Presumption
of Validity

Post-grant
review/reexamination
goes against patent

Patent Invalidated

Presumption of
Invalidity

Patent litigation (PH
loses on the issue of
validity)

Patent Invalidation

Patent Invalidation

B. MULTI-STAGE POST-GRANT REVIEW
One of the main fears in relation to post-grant review is that
it will be subject to the same kinds of strategic abuse that plagues
the current patent litigation system. Post-grant review can
improve the patent system by allowing for more focused
examination of patents that appear to have been improperly
granted, but a badly structured system of post-grant review may
also allow potential infringers to harass patent owners whose
patents are not so suspect. To address this concern, we propose
that post-grant review should be divided into two phases such
that patent challengers have to essentially pre-qualify for the
right to challenge the patent. The current patent system limits
the opportunity to challenge a patent to those persons who (a)
have a reasonable apprehension of being sued by the patent
holder and (b) have several hundred thousand dollars to spend on
federal court litigation. 275 These restrictions prevent parties
without a strong direct interest from challenging bad patents.
For post-grant review, we propose a very different kind of
limitation on the right to challenge the validity of a patent.
Namely, post-grant review should be open to any person who is
able to convince the Patent Office that there is a reasonable
chance that one or more of the patent claims was issued in error.
Accordingly, the first stage of post-grant review should be used as
a screening device according to whether the challenge rises to the
level of a “substantial new question in relation to
patentability.” 276

275. AIPLA ECON. SURVEY, supra note 41, at 108.
276. Currently, reexamination requires a finding of a substantial new
question of patentability based on the prior art submissions. See Consolidated
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1. Stage One
Under our proposal the first stage of post-grant review has
three key features: (i) the requirement that the challenger
establishes that there is a substantial new question of
patentability in relation to the patent; (ii) it is conducted on an ex
parte basis, without the participation of the patent holder; and
(iii) the Patent Office’s determination on the initial phase of the
challenge would become a matter of public record.
i. Substantial New Question of Patentability
Stage One of the system of post-grant review that we propose
would require any person wishing to challenge the validity of an
issued patent to demonstrate to a Patent Office examiner (other
than the person who examined the patent in the first place) that
there is a substantial new question of patentability in relation to
the patent. For example, a challenger could submit prior art that
was not reviewed by the examiner and argue that the prior art
demonstrated that the claimed invention was not, in fact, novel at
the time the patent holder “invented” it. 277
The substantial new question of patentability test clearly
limits the situations in which challengers can subject a patent
owner to post-grant review. One likely objection to this
requirement is that it will not allow for the review of invalid
patents where the examiner did consider all the relevant
material, but simply misunderstood the technology.
This
limitation is necessary from the perspective of differential impact
because post-grant review is neither intended to catch every
mistake made by the Patent Office nor function as a total
substitution for litigation. Pre-qualification will reduce the
universe of reviewable patents down to those where errors are
most likely so that an administrative system can most efficiently
deal with them.
One of the main advantages of this two stage structure is
that it allows a potential infringer to obtain the benefit of the
Patent Office’s opinion on newly surfaced art references at a very
low cost. If the potential infringer is right, and there is a
substantial new question of patentability, she is in a good position
to reject the patent holder’s demands for a license. If she is
wrong, it is the patent holder who is advantaged because the
Patent Office will publicly announce that, even in light of the
Patent Rules, 37 C.F.R. § 1.515 (2007), MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING
PROCEDURES § 2201 (8th ed., Rev. 2, 2004).
277. See 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2000).
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challenger’s prior art, the patent is nonetheless valid – all at no
cost to the patent holder. The differential impact here should be
obvious: bad patents are more easily challenged, whereas good
patents are actually strengthened by the first stage of the MPGR
process.
ii. Stage One Proceedings Ex Parte
An important feature of the first stage of post-grant review is
that it takes place on an ex parte basis, without the involvement
of, or possibly even the knowledge of, the patent holder. The
patent holder only becomes involved in the review process if a
patent examiner can be convinced that the challenger has raised
an objection to the patent that merits post-grant review and that
is appropriate to the post-grant review forum. Patent holders will
naturally be concerned that their rights may be unfairly affected
by the first stage of the MPGR process. However, excluding them
from the first stage of post-grant review actually benefits them by
reducing the possibility that post-grant review is used by
challengers as a form of harassment. Another benefit of the ex
parte nature of the first stage of MPGR is that it forces potential
infringers to disclose what may be their best evidence at an early
stage in the proceeding, before the patent holder has incurred any
cost in defending her patent.
iii. Mandatory Publication of Stage One Findings
As previously discussed, one of the problems with relying on
private parties to challenge invalid or over reaching patent
assertions is that even those parties that do have the incentive to
start such an action may well lack the incentive to finish it. 278
Individual challengers will often be better off settling with the
patent holder for a trivial amount of money than investing more
resources into their challenge only to have to share their victory
with all of their competitors. 279 Early settlement can be efficient
from the point of view of the parties immediately involved, but it
means that any future challenger must begin anew. Also,
assuming that the terms of settlement are kept secret, other

278. See supra Part II.C.
279. See John R. Thomas, Collusion and Collective Action in Patent System: A
Proposal for Patent Bounties, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 305, 333 (2001) (characterizing
a patent validity challenge as a public good susceptible to a free rider problem
where competitors are able to freely practice the invention claimed in the
invalidated patent as a result of the challenger’s efforts).
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potential challengers do not get the advantage of knowing how
strong the parties thought the patent was.
Under our proposal, a challenger is not forced to pursue the
MPGR process to its final conclusion, but the Patent Office’s stage
one determination on the initial challenge would become a matter
of public record. The Patent Office’s findings with respect to the
first stage would be published and any subsequent challenger
would be entitled to use those findings in post-grant review or
litigation.
What is the significance of these published findings? The
patent is not invalid at this stage, 280 but the first hurdle to MPGR
has been cleared. From this point on, it will be easier for a third
party to pick up where the initial challenger left off, even if the
initial challenger is appeased by the patent holder. This reduces
the early settlement problems discussed in Part II. Also, the
public recording of the Patent Office’s determination as to the
existence of a substantial new question of patentability conveys
significant information to the market about the likely quality of
patent; that is, it provides a low cost method of clearly flagging at
least some bad patents without raising the costs to good patent
holders.
2. Stage Two
The second stage of MPGR consists of a review of the
challenge by a review panel of the Patent Office. Ideally this
review panel would consist of three experienced patent
examiners, none of whom had made a decision with respect to the
patent at any other time. This review would take the form of an
adversarial proceeding in which any interested party would be
allowed to make written submissions.
At this stage, any party – including the original challenger,
the patent holder, or a new challenger – may force the
continuation of the MPGR process or join the MPGR process. In
the case where the original challenger does not continue the
process and no new challenger picks up the process, the patent
holder can remove any lingering doubts as to the validity of her
patent by continuing, on their own, with arguments to the Patent
Office.
C. CLAIM CONSTRUCTION AND POST-GRANT REVIEW
The current patent system does not provide any mechanism
280. Similarly, the patent is not subject to a presumption of invalidity if our
proposal for a variable presumption of validity is accepted.

SAG M & ROHDE K. Patent Reform and Differential Impact. MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 2006;8(1):193.

82

MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH.

[Vol. 8:1

for dealing with ambiguous patent claims other than federal court
litigation. A unique feature of our proposal is that it would bring
questions of claim construction into post-grant review such that
both invalid and hyper-asserted patents could be addressed.
Poor quality examination, ambiguity of language and the
unpredictable path of technology all lead to ambiguous patent
claims.
In consequence, established patent holders and
entrepreneurial patent collectors have an incentive to take a
second look at old patents relating to one technology to determine
whether they can plausibly be asserted in relation to some new
technology. BT’s attempt to assert patent rights in relation to
Internet hyperlinks exemplifies this problem. 281 Similarly, the
2004 case of Superguide Corp. v. DirecTV Enterprises addressed
whether a patent relating to “a system for electronically
controllably viewing updateable information” on an analog
television should also be construed to cover digital television
technology that was not developed until well after the patent
issued. 282
How can post-grant review address the over-assertion of
patents that may nonetheless have a core of validity? Our
proposal is that post-grant review should be tailored to allow
potential infringers to negate certain claim constructions. 283 For
example, assume that a potential infringer has reason to be
concerned about a patent whose claims could be construed to
mean either A or B, where meaning A is fairly narrow and would
not implicate the activities of the potential infringer but meaning
B is much broader and would implicate the activities of the
potential infringer.
It would be advantageous if the potential infringer was able
to put the issue of claim construction to the Patent Office through
the process of post-grant review. However, the problem with
asking the Patent Office to adjudicate claim construction is that
any construction given by the Patent Office may prove to be just
281. See supra notes 53–54 and accompanying text.
282. 358 F.3d 870 (Fed. Cir. 2004); see also Mark A. Lemley, The Changing
Meaning of Patent Claim Terms, 104 MICH. L. REV. 101 (2005).
283. This is analogous to the Securities and Exchange Commission’s practice
of issuing “no-action” letters. See U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, No
Action Letters, http://www.sec.gov/answers/noaction.htm (last visited Jan. 20,
2007) (“An individual or entity who is not certain whether a particular product,
service, or action would constitute a violation of the federal securities law may
request a ‘no-action’ letter from the SEC staff.”). Michael Carroll has proposed a
similar innovation with respect to the fair use doctrine in copyright law. See
Michael Carroll, Fixing Fair Use (working paper, on file with authors 2005).
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as fallible as the initial claim language. In other words, any
definitive claim construction rendered by the Patent Office may
simply provide a second set of words that will be ambiguous and
subject to the unpredictable path of technology for the remainder
of the life of the patent. There is, however, a solution to this
problem.
Although the Patent Office may be in no better position to
say what the true meaning of patent claim should be after postgrant review than it was at the time the patent issued, it should
be able to determine what the patent does not mean. 284 Under
our proposal, potential infringers would present the Patent Office
with a negative claim construction. For example, a developer of
Voice Over Internet Protocol (VOIP) technology might be
concerned that a particular patent dealing very generally with
packet loss might be infringed by the developer’s specific
techniques that deal with packet loss in the context of VOIP.285
In this example, the developer would be able to ask the
Patent Office to confirm its understanding that the patent does
not apply to the type of packet loss prevention used in VOIP – a
proposition that the Patent Office may or may not agree with. In
fact, any question of claim construction presented in this fashion
should contain two distinct questions: (1) does the claim
encompass the broader meaning, and (2) if so, is the claim valid?
The reason for this second element is that there is an inherent
link between claim scope and validity. For many patent owners
broad claim construction is a mixed blessing. On the one hand,
broad claims increase the likelihood that the patent will confer
economic power if valid, but on the other, the broader a claim
becomes, the more likely it is to be found invalid on the basis of
lack of novelty, obviousness, lack of enablement, or improper
written description.
Chiron v. Genentech 286 illustrates this problem nicely. In
Chiron the court had to decide the proper scope of the patent
holder’s rights with respect to the isolation/creation of monoclonal
antibodies that were capable of binding with the human antigen

284. Under the current law, the Patent Office is supposed to give claims “their
broadest reasonable interpretation consistent with the specification” both at the
time of examination and under reexamination. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d
1303, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2005); see also 37 C.F.R. § 1.75(d)(1).
285. See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 6,016,513 (filed Jan. 18, 2000) (claiming “a
method of preventing packet loss during transfer of a plurality of data packets
between a network interface card and a host operating system of the computer
system.”).
286. Chiron v. Genentech, 363 F.3d 1247 (Fed Cir. 2004).
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The patent holder had
associated with breast cancer. 287
developed a number of these antigens using hybridoma
technology developed in the early 1980’s. 288 Hybridoma cells are
used to produce monoclonal antibodies by interacting with cells
from an animal that has been challenged with the relevant
antigen. 289 A significant problem in medical applications of this
technique is that the end product contains murine (mouse
derived) antibodies that are strongly rejected by the human
immune system. 290 In the late 1980’s scientists developed a way
to overcome this problem by using recombinant DNA technology.
Under this approach, DNA that encodes the binding portion of
monoclonal mouse antibodies is merged with human antibodies to
produce “chimeric” or “humanized” antibodies. 291 These
antibodies are far more useful in medical applications because of
lower rates of rejection by the human immune system. 292
The question for the court in Chiron was whether the patent
claims covered all creation of monoclonal antibodies that were
capable of binding with human antigen associated with breast
cancer, or whether they were limited to those produced through
This question was
the plaintiff’s hybridoma technology. 293
significant because one of the patent holder’s competitors had
developed superior monoclonal antibodies through the application
of recombinant DNA technology. 294 Illustrating the dual nature
of broad claim construction, the court ruled that the patent claims
applied to both methods of producing the antibodies, but also that
the patent holder had failed to meet the enablement
requirements with respect to that technology. Indeed, according
to the Federal Circuit, there was no way the plaintiff’s main
patent could have enabled chimeric antibody technology because
that technology had not been invented at the relevant time. 295
287. Id. at 1254-58.
288. Id. at 1251.
289. See Thomas A. Waldmann, Immunotherapy: Past, Present and Future, 9
NATURE MED. 269 (2003),
available at http://www.nature.com/cgitaf/DynaPage.taf?file=/nm/journal/v9/n3/full/nm0303-269.html&filetype=pdf.
290. Id.
291. Id.
292. Id.
293. Chiron, 363 F.3d at 1251-53.
294. Id.
295. The court held that genetically engineered antibodies, specifically
chimeric antibodies, first appeared as a successful technology in the literature of
this art field in May 1984. This new technology arose after the patent holder’s
initial filing date and thus was, by definition, outside the bounds of the
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Post-grant review should be structured to allow potential
infringers or other interested parties to present negative claim
constructions to the Patent Office for review because the breadth
of claim construction is inherently tied to claim validity. As the
Chiron case illustrates, broad claim construction is a two-edged
sword. While an expansive reading of the patent’s claims may
help the patent owner assert her rights more broadly, it may also
jeopardize the validity of the patent. Broadly interpreted patent
claims expand the universe of potentially invalidating prior art,
and make it more difficult to meet the statutory requirements of
written description and enablement. 296
The Patent Office could respond to a request for a negative
claim construction in one of three ways: (1) determine that the
claim in question does not cover the defined product, process, or
method; (2) determine that the claim in question does cover the
defined product process or method, but that in light of that
construction the patent should not have been issued; (3) neither 1
nor 2 (which carries the implication that the claim in question
covers the defined product, process, or method). Where the Patent
Office determines that the claim in question does not cover the
defined product, process, or method (option 1), that negative
construction would have to be taken into account in any
subsequent litigation. Where the Patent Office determines that
the claim in question does cover the defined product, process, or
method but that in light of that construction the patent should
not have been issued (option 2), the patent would be
presumptively invalid with respect to that claim. Where the
Patent Office makes neither of those determinations (option 3),
the patent would be entitled to a strong presumption of validity
with respect to an infringer who fell within the specifications of
the negative construction.
How does this relate to our proposed threshold of a
substantial new question of patentability? Essentially, we

enablement requirement. The Court further held the patent holder’s later
applications in 1985 and 1986 also failed to meet the enablement requirement
because even though the technology to genetically engineer chimeric antibodies
existed at that point, in order to claim rights with respect to a nascent technology
the patent would have to have provided a “specific and useful teaching.” Id. at
1257.
296. 35 USC § 112 (2000). The specification shall contain a written description
of the invention, and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such
full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to
which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the
same, and shall set forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying
out her invention. Id.
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envisage that the Patent Office would review applications for a
negative claim construction to determine whether they raised a
significant or serious question. Although this is not the same as
substantial new question of patentability, it could be employed in
a similar filtering fashion. The Patent Office should be given a
broad discretion to decide whether to consider applications for
negative claim constructions; it should also be allowed to develop
an appropriate filtering standard under its rule making
authority. 297
D. DISPUTED FEATURES OF POST-GRANT REVIEW
The procedural details of post-grant review are of critical
importance because post-grant review only makes sense if it
presents a viable low cost alternative to litigation. Accordingly,
commentary typically focuses on the attractiveness of post-grant
review to potential challengers. 298 However, the question of
differential cost is just as significant as cost in general. As we
have argued at length in this article, an important criterion
should be whether any proposed element of post-grant review
imposes higher costs on bad patents than it does on good patents.
This leads us to make the following recommendations with
respect to other disputed features of post-grant review.
1. Issues of Format, Scope and Discovery
The fundamental design constraint for post-grant review is
cost. If post-grant review is going to work as a genuine
alternative to litigation, it must be significantly more affordable
than patent litigation. Controlling the legal costs of post-grant
review requires eliminating the two greatest expenses of
litigation: discovery and oral argument. In contrast to the
proposals for limited discovery in the House and Senate Bills 299
and the recommendations of the NAS and the FTC, 300 we believe
that so long as the scope of reviewable issues is kept narrow,
discovery will be unnecessary.
297. 35 U.S.C. § 2(b)(2) (2000) (powers and duties of the United States Patent
& Trademark Office).
298. Kesan & Gallo, supra note 22, at 101 (describing how many “bad” patents
are never revoked or even challenged in court).
299. Patent Act of 2005, H.R. 2795, 109th Cong. § 9 (draft amendment to H.R.
2795 recommended discovery for depositions of persons submitting affidavits or
declarations as well as any additional discovery that is “required in the interest
of justice”).
300. See NAS REPORT, supra note 24, at 96; FTC REPORT, supra note 4, at 11.
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This, in turn, requires that the scope of issues under review
in post-grant review be limited so that the exclusion of discovery
and oral argument does not lead to injustice. Consistent with the
House Bill and the Senate Bill, we believe the scope of post-grant
review should be limited to issues relating to patentability. This
ensures that the Patent Office can review the patent without any
inquiry into the inventor’s state of mind or personal knowledge at
the time of the application. The practical effect of this
recommendation is that post-grant review would extend to
novelty, obviousness, and enablement, but would not include
issues such as statutory bars, best mode or inequitable conduct.
Given these limitations, both discovery and oral arguments
should not be necessary for the parties to make effective
arguments concerning patentability.
2. Window of Opportunity
If post-grant review is going to provide a real alternative to
litigation, it must be available to potential infringers at any point
in time after the patent has issued. The NAS, the FTC, and the
current House Bill all recommend a limited time period during
which post-grant review may be utilized, varying from nine
months to a year. 301 The NAS further proposes a trigger allowing
post-grant review whenever the patent holder alleges
infringement by lawsuit or notice of intent to file suit. 302
In contrast, we believe that post-grant review must be
available for the life of the patent. Critics suggest that the
opposition period be limited for a variety of reasons: a limited
period reduces the misuse of post-grant review proceedings by
challengers who wish to delay or injure the patent holder; 303
property law favors a settled title because this allows value
expectations to settle, thereby engendering commercial stability
and fostering the market for patent licensing; 304 and efficiency
results from reducing uncertainty over patent validity. 305 While
these are real concerns, we see more immediate and definable
negative effects that result from a limited time period for post301. See NAS REPORT, supra note 24, at 115 (one year window plus a trigger);
FTC REPORT, supra note 4, at 234-235, n.168 (citing the PTO’s one year
recommendation and recommending a fixed period for post-grant review
availability); Patent Reform Act of 2005, H.R. 2795, 109th Cong. § 9 (2005).
302. See NAS REPORT, supra note 24, at 115.
303. Farrell & Merges, supra note 22, at 968.
304. Id. at n.74 (quoting Steven G. Kunin & Anton W. Fetting, The
Metamorphosis of Inter Partes Reexamination, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 971
(2004).
305. Kesan & Gallo, supra note 22, at 91.
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grant review.
First, a limited time period for post-grant review creates a
burden on firms to actively and closely monitor every Patent
Office proceeding for subject matter which relates to their current
or future products. Interested third parties who fail to monitor
Patent Office proceedings would reside in an information void.
They would be precluded in many instances from availing
themselves of the low cost post-grant review alternative to
litigation. This monitoring is an across-the-board increase in
costs.
Second, if bad patent holders know that competitors do not
closely monitor Patent Office proceedings, bad patent holders
have an incentive to wait until the close of the opposition period
before asserting their patents. Similarly, holders of good patents
who are nonetheless uncertain of their patent’s strength have an
incentive to wait until the limited opposition period closes before
asserting their rights. If no limited opposition period existed, it
would make no difference when holders of good patents asserted
their rights, as they could assert their rights whenever it became
strategically optimal for them to do so.
Third, it is relatively uncommon for patents to be litigated
within the first nine months after issuance. 306 According to John
Allison et al., patent litigation, on average, reaches a peak during
the third year following issuance and continues at a significant
pace through at least the fifteenth year following issuance. 307
3. Estoppel
It is widely agreed that the current inter-partes
reexamination system has been underutilized because
challengers who fail to persuade the Patent Office in
reexamination are estopped from raising the same arguments in
subsequent litigation. 308 The House Bill repeats this short-coming
with respect to post-grant review. Specifically, the House Bill
bars a challenger from raising “any issue of fact or law actually
decided and necessary to the determination” of an opposition
proceeding once a final determination of that opposition has been
made. 309 The House Bill provides an exception for a challenger
306.
307.
308.
309.
(2006).

Allison, supra note 76, at app. Fig. 1.
Id.
See supra notes 257–259 and accompanying text.
Patents Depend on Quality Act of 2006, H.R. 5096, 109th Cong. § 2
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who demonstrates that there is additional material factual
evidence that could not reasonably have been discovered or
presented in the opposition proceeding. 310
The Senate Bill takes a slightly different approach. This Bill
proposes a limited form of estoppel for challenges initiated within
a year of the issuance of the patent and a broader form of estoppel
for any challenge initiated thereafter. 311 Under the limited
estoppel approach, a challenger would only be estopped from
raising an issue of fact or law that it did in fact raise in
opposition. In contrast, under the broader form of estoppel
potential infringers wishing to avail themselves of post-grant
opposition would be barred from subsequently raising any
grounds they raised or could have raised in the opposition
proceeding. 312
We disagree with both the House and the Senate Bills in this
respect because post-grant review can only be effective if
potential infringers are willing to use it. Accordingly, we propose
entirely removing estoppel from post-grant review. The argument
against removing estoppel is that it serves to prevent repetitive or
harassing proceedings and litigation. There are two problems
with this reasoning. First, it assumes that repetitive or harassing
litigation is a more significant problem than an under-utilized
system of post-grant review. Second, there are better ways of
protecting the legitimate interests of patent holders and
preventing the inappropriate use of post-grant review. For
example, as we have already proposed, post-grant review could be
divided into two phases, so that patent challengers have to
essentially pre-qualify for the right to challenge the patent.
4. Amendment of Claims during Post-Grant Review
We propose that amendments be allowed during post-grant
review, but that they nonetheless be subjected to the same
adversarial proceedings as all other patentability considerations
during post-grant review. In some respects, this differs from
other recommendations. The NAS report is silent on this
matter. 313 The FTC recommends allowing amendments, but does
not address the issue of whether they may be argued against by
the challenger. 314 It would seem imprudent not to allow the

310.
311.
312.
313.
314.

Id.
Patent Reform Act of 2005, S. 3818, 109th Cong. § 9 (2006).
Id.
See NAS REPORT, supra note 24.
See FTC REPORT, supra note 4, at 16, 193–96.
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expertise and information forwarding capabilities of the
challenger to be heard. Though the challenger may be motivated
by different concerns than the Patent Office, the Patent Office
would still be the ultimate arbiter of patentability issues and
should be able to separate rhetoric from truly relevant prior art
and argument.
The undesirable alternative is to allow
uncontested amendments, which could eventually be subjected to
another round of post-grant review challenges based on new
submissions by the current challenger. This is an inefficient use
of resources and the probability of later challenges should be
eliminated through the use of a more timely challenge during the
amendment process.
E. THE IMPLICATIONS OF DIFFERENTIAL IMPACT FOR POST-GRANT
REVIEW
The differential impact criteria we have established in this
article suggest the implementation of a very different kind of
post-grant review system from those that are currently on the
table. The first point of departure is the variable presumption of
validity. The main advantage of applying a variable presumption
of validity is that it differentiates based on patent characteristics
that are tied to validity in a probabilistic sense. Patents that are
issued and never challenged have probably only been scrutinized
for between 18 and 41.5 hours, 315 whereas a patent that has been
subject to post-grant review will have been subjected to hundreds
of hours of intensive examination. Thus, a patent which is upheld
after post-grant review seems much more likely to be valid than
one which has not. Another advantage of the variable
presumption of validity is that it facilitates a streamlined postgrant review system that does not overlap with judicial
proceedings by applying a presumption of invalidity to patents
that are successfully challenged in post-grant review. Our
proposal is that post-grant review should not be the subject of any
appeal. Rather, a patent holder who believes that the Patent
Office was in error should simply attempt to enforce her rights in
court. If she is successful, the Patent Office’s post-grant review
determination is effectively overruled, if not, the ruling stands.
This streamlined system will keep the cost of post-grant review
affordable and will also make it clear that post-grant review is
not simply an alternative forum for litigation.

315. See supra note 62.
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The second point of departure between the system of postgrant review we envisage and the current raft of legislative
proposals is that we believe that post-grant review should be
comprised of two distinct stages. Under our proposed multi-stage
post-grant review, challengers would have to effectively earn the
right to challenge a patent by convincing the Patent Office that
they were able to demonstrate some substantial new question of
patentability that had not yet been considered at the time the
patent was initially examined. MPGR may be more efficient than
a single stage process because it allows potential infringers to
resolve one of the major uncertainties of patent litigation very
early in the process. It is often the case that a potential infringer
will form the opinion that a particular piece of prior art is fatal to
the validity of the patent, but to test that opinion currently
requires commitment to substantial litigation costs. This filtering
device will narrow down those cases eligible for post-grant review
to those instances where there is clearly a significant question to
be addressed. While this may allow a number of invalid patents to
escape post-grant review, it will also protect the majority of good
patents from unmeritorious post-grant review proceedings. Multistage post-grant review is essential to ensuring that post-grant
review has more impact on bad patents than on good ones by
balancing the need for low cost challenge with the need to protect
patent holders from undue harassment.
Our third point of departure with the current post-grant
review proposals relates to claim construction. Currently the only
way a potential infringer can obtain any certainty with respect to
ambiguous patent claims is via federal court litigation. However,
this is only an option to persons who have a reasonable
apprehension of being sued for infringement by the patent holder.
This seems overly restrictive because it does not provide any
means whereby a person can test the meaning of a patent claim
without investing in activity that is potentially infringing. Our
proposal is that potential infringers should be able to negate
certain claim constructions through post-grant review.
CONCLUSION
Congressional efforts to address the crisis of confidence in the
United States patent system have failed up to the present day. If
Congress is to have any hope of passing much needed legislative
reform to the Patent Act, the supporters of patent reform will
have to unite behind a streamlined set of proposals that directly
address the most pressing and unambiguous defects of the
current patent system. To that end, we have proposed applying a
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test of differential impact to enable Congress to prioritize those
reforms which will discourage the acquisition and assertion of bad
patents without unduly prejudicing the interests of the holders of
good patents. The differential impact approach elucidated in this
article has three distinct advantages over other, proffered efforts
to rewrite the patent system from the ground up. First, the
differential impact approach provides a mechanism by which to
evaluate competing claims for legislative resources. Second, the
differential impact approach is an appropriate response to the
empirical uncertainty surrounding optimal patent scope. Third,
differential impact is consistent with the need to take the
legitimate expectations of current stakeholders into account.
The economic models developed in this article suggest that
individuals and businesses accused of patent infringement often
have weak incentives to challenge bad patents, even when they
are fairly sure those patents are invalid. Additionally, these
economic models demonstrate that patent holders have strong
incentives to demand royalties which are not in fact supported by
the patents they hold. These demands may be unsupported either
because the patent is invalid, or because it is much narrower in
scope than the patent holder represents. The AF-model indicates
that where targeting costs are low and the prospect of retaliation
is small, a rational patent holder will broadly assert her patent
even where the probability that any individual target will accept
a license is low.
The AF-model is particularly useful in
determining which proposed reforms are likely to have a
differential impact on bad patents because it indicates that
exposing patent holders to retaliation when they assert their
patents has the potential to create a differential cost between
good patent holders and bad patent holders.
In Part III of this article we have reviewed a wide range of
reform proposals relating to patent examination, substantive
patent doctrine, the structure and procedures of patent litigation.
Of all the reforms surveyed, the one that appears to have the best
potential for differential impact is post-grant review.
The importance of post-grant review is highlighted by the
economic models developed in this article. First, the CF-model
indicates that the high cost of federal court litigation shields bad
patents from scrutiny in many cases. Post-grant review will
address this by providing a low cost method of challenging
patents. Second, the AF-model indicates that it would be more
costly to assert bad patents if the expected cost of retaliation for
asserting a bad patent was significantly higher than the expected
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cost of retaliation for asserting a good patent. Currently, both
good and bad patents are placed at considerable risk in federal
court litigation. 316 However, in post-grant review, only bad
patents have a significant probability of being invalidated.
Consequently, the AF-model indicates that introducing a system
of post-grant review would discourage the assertion of bad
patents without discouraging the assertion of good patents. Third,
both the CF-model and the AF-model indicate that uncertainty
and information asymmetries relating to patent quality are
detrimental to good patents and advantageous to bad patents.
Under a system of post-grant review, potential infringers will be
able to resolve key questions relating to patent validity more
quickly and more cheaply than in federal court litigation. As a
result, post-grant review will also have a differential impact on
bad patents by reducing uncertainty and information
asymmetries relating to patent quality.
In order to further demonstrate the utility of our differential
impact approach, we have applied the standard to sketch an
outline of how post-grant review should be implemented.
Interestingly, looking at post-grant review through the lens of
differential impact leads us to propose a very different kind of
system to that currently embodied in the House Bill, the Senate
Bill or those proposed by the FTC, the NAS and various other
commentators. 317
Adopting the differential impact standard elaborated in this
article will enable Congress to evaluate and prioritize competing
patent reform proposals. As such, the differential impact test
provides a way out of the legislative quagmire that seems to have
engulfed the patent reform movement.

316. This is not to suggest the risk is the same regardless of the underlying
validity of the patent.
317. The differences between our MPGR proposal and other versions of postgrant review are summarized at the beginning of this article. See supra Part IV.

